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Foreword
Interest in a value-added tax (VAT) does not seem inclined to go away. A $3 trillion national 
debt, annual federal deficits that— even in an era of trust fund surpluses and Gramm-Rudman- 
Hollings spending restrictions— seem difficult to bring down to below $100 billion, and the 
fact that the major effort in 1984-86 to reform the income tax system produced a result that was 
essentially breakeven have encouraged a continuing perception that some other major re­
venue source may yet have to be found if the United States is to be truly serious on the subject 
of fiscal responsibility.
Whatever its drawbacks, few will dispute that a VAT can produce substantial revenues. In 
its most recent report on annual budgetary options, issued in February 1989, the nonpartisan 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that a 5 percent VAT on a comprehensive 
consumption base would raise over $490 billion in the five fiscal years ended September 30, 
1994. Even a VAT designed to avoid certain regressive features by putting a zero tax rate on 
food, housing, and health care would raise over $280 billion in the same period. In contrast, 
the same CBO report projects that changing the present income tax system to add a 33 percent 
permanent bracket would raise “only” $43 billion for those five years and, alternatively, raising 
the 15 percent and 28 percent marginal brackets in today’s system to 16 percent and 30 
percent, respectively, would produce $167 billion for the five years. In short, VAT arithmetic 
is extremely powerful.
Historically, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Tax Division 
has had a substantial interest in the VAT. The Tax Division’s Statement of Tax Policy No. 2, 
issued in 1975, is titled Value-Added Tax. In addition, the AICPA published a study document 
in 1985 titled Alternatives to the Present Tax System fo r  Increasing Saving and Investment, 
which considered, inter alia, both transactional consumption taxes (such as VAT) and a 
progressive annual consumption tax.
Statement of Tax Policy No. 2 concluded that the imposition of an indirect tax at the federal 
level “merits serious consideration.” It concluded further that should such a tax be adopted, 
the preferred form would be a national retail sales tax. Finally, it concluded that were a VAT 
rather than a retail sales tax adopted, it should be of the “classical” type (that is, with liability 
determined under the credit method) and should involve expensing of capital purchases.
We are now approaching fifteen years from the issuance of that policy statement, and 
although fiscal conditions have changed, interest in a VAT is still with us. Accordingly, the 
AICPA Tax Division continues its strong interest in this subject. A task force is organizing to 
restudy the policy issues inherent in broad-based consumption taxes, with the expectation that 
an updated or revised policy statement will be issued in 1990 or 1991.
This paper is not a policy statement but, rather, a study document. It takes no position on 
whether the United States should adopt a VAT (or any other form of tax on consumption). 
Instead, it focuses on the question, I f  the United States were to adopt a value-added tax, what 
issues need to be considered in designing that tax to make it both fair and flexible? W e  
therefore believe this study can contribute significantly to an understanding of the problems 
that would inevitably be encountered in designing such a tax.
This study document was prepared by Lorence L. Bravenec, Director of the Graduate Tax 
Program and Thomas W. Leland Memorial Professor at Texas A & M  University. Professor 
Bravenec served on the AICPA Tax Division Task Force on the Value-Added Tax from 1980 to 
1984.
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INTRODUCTION
The value-added tax (VAT) will undoubtedly be considered seriously whenever the federal 
government realistically tackles its budget deficit. The alternatives to a VAT are to broaden the 
federal income tax base further, increase federal income tax rates, or both. None of these 
alternatives to a VAT may be attractive to a Congress that has recently struggled mightily to 
broaden this base and reduce these rates.
It is generally assumed that if a VAT is adopted in the United States, it will be a credit form, 
along the European model. 1 This study considers selected design issues in a credit method 
VAT for the United States, based largely on the United Kingdom’s experience with its VAT.2 
The study neither duplicates nor evaluates the federal government’s major VAT design work: 
Value-Added Tax, volume 3 of The Treasury Department Report to the President—Tax 
Reform fo r  Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth.3 Instead, the study complements and 
extends the Treasury report.
The study is organized as follows; Chapter 1 considers extensively the flexibility of a VAT 
and the manner in which a VAT could be used to influence taxpayer and citizen behavior. 
Chapter 2 briefly lists possible design criteria. Chapter 3 considers how a VAT might be 
designed to operate cost-efficiently from the points of view of government administration and 
taxpayer compliance. Chapter 4 evaluates various special provisions from the points of view of 
efficiency and avoidance prevention effectiveness, on the assumption that special provisions 
will or should intrude on a VAT of the United States just as they intrude on its income tax. 
Finally, chapter 5 considers the design of a VAT that will be fair in both reality and appearance, 
including approaches for building progressivity into the VAT.
The reader should recognize some of the shortcomings of this study. It is based largely on 
the author’s observations of the U.K. VAT and on his conversations and interviews with U.K. 
persons with VAT expertise. Nevertheless, because the U.K. VAT is based on comprehensive 
guidelines set out by European Economic Community directives, the study is generally 
representative of the experiences of the other European Economic Community nations.
Further, although the study is generally comprehensive, it does not attempt to duplicate the 
discussion found in the 1984 Treasury study and it does not deal with special problems 
presented by the federal system of government in the United States. Thus, the study does not 
cover design issues arising out of an attempt to integrate a federal credit method VAT with 
state sales taxes or state credit method VATs.
It is hoped that the study will give insights and information about the credit method VAT 
that are not presently available and that it will encourage and assist further work by interested 
persons.
Although members of the AICPA Tax Division’s Federal Taxation Executive Committee, 
Tax Policy and Planning Subcommittee, and staff, together with VAT-knowledgeable U.K. 
persons, have commented on matters found in this study, the author is solely responsible for 
all matters contained in the study. The author expresses his gratitude to the foregoing persons, 
as well as to the organizations contributing to this study and to the U.K. practitioners 
interviewed, for their substantial assistance in this study.
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Chapter 1
FLEXIBILITY AND NEUTRALITY OF THE VAT
Care should be taken that a value-added tax (VAT) is not oversold as a neutral tax.4 
Proponents o f a credit m ethod VAT for the United States often cite the supposed neutrality o f 
the VAT— its minimal impact on the operating, financing, and organizing decisions o f business 
enterprises— as a primary advantage,5 in contrast to the nonneutral income tax. The incom e 
tax, however, is not inherently nonneutral. It is simply highly flexible and therefore capable o f 
being made nonneutral by Congress. The lack o f neutrality o f the U.S. incom e tax derives 
largely from its tax rates, its failure to integrate the corporate and individual income taxes, and 
its timing o f incom e realization and deductions.
Accordingly, if a VAT for the United States is to be comprehensive, but neutral in the sense 
that it does not affect business decisions, it must either escape the influence o f the political 
processes that converted the U.S. incom e tax into a nonneutral tax or lack the kind o f flexibility 
that permits nonneutrality. Neither neutrality assumption for the VAT appears well-founded. 
To assume that a VAT would escape political pressures and other considerations similar to 
those affecting the U.S. incom e tax is unrealistic. Further, as discussed subsequently, the VAT 
is an extremely flexible tax. For similar reasons, the VAT should not be oversold as a simple 
tax.
V A T  C o n c e p ts  an d  M e ch a n ics
To grasp the probable techniques for nonneutral and complex treatment under a credit 
method VAT, its concepts and mechanics must first be understood.
The concept o f a VAT is straightforward: A tax is imposed on the value added at each stage in 
the production and distribution o f goods and services. Each fully taxable person along the 
production and distribution chain pays a tax on the value that he or she adds to the product. 
(Hereinafter, the person who collects and remits the VAT will be called a “ taxable person” or 
“ taxpayer. ” )6
Liability under the credit m ethod VAT, as applicable to fully taxable profit-seeking activities 
o f a person, is determ ined by the following formula:
VAT Charged on Sales 
VAT to Be Remitted =  (i.e., Rate X  Sales) — VAT Paid on Purchases 
(or Refu nded) (“ Sales VAT” ) (“ Purchase VAT” )
Assuming that all businesses are fully taxable and that a uniform rate is applicable, the 
following observations concerning the calculation o f a fully taxable person’s VAT liability under 
the credit m ethod  may be made:7
• The VAT is levied on sales (the price at which goods or services are sold), and the seller is 
the taxpayer.8
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• To avoid double taxation, a credit for the VAT on purchases is generally given the 
taxpayer but not the ultimate consumer. This credit is generally available even if there is 
a net refund and even on purchases of capital goods and unsold inventory.9
• The tax is levied at a proportional rate on each transaction and not at progressive rates.
• The VAT is imposed at each stage of production and distribution, including the retail 
stage, making the tax multistage and comprehensive.10
• The amount of value added is not directly determined under the formula. In general, 
however, the amount to be remitted under the credit method VAT approximates a tax 
imposed on the value added by each fully taxable person (that is, the result under a tax on 
profits, increased by wages, rent expense, depreciation, and cost of inventory sold and 
decreased by capital expenditures and inventory acquisition cost).11
Flexibility of the credit method VAT could be introduced at almost any part of the formula 
(for example, the rate applicable, the timing of remittances, the taxable status of a person, the 
taxation or nontaxation of the sale, and the availability, timing, and amount of the credit).
VAT Rate Flexibility
In general, the higher the rate on an activity, the greater the impact of the VAT on business 
decisions. Thus, the VAT will have a proportional effect on business decisions, such as those 
relating to cash flow and to the possible denial or deferral of credit for VAT on purchases.12 In 
addition, because the incidence of the VAT among businesses and customers could influence 
pricing decisions and the decision to expand or contract operations, the ability to vary the VAT 
rate (or rates) reflects a power to influence these decisions.13
Multiple Rates
Multiple rates are common under a VAT. In the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, 
there is a standard rate of 14 percent and a reduced rate of 7 percent,14 while France has a 
standard rate of 18.6 percent and three other rates.15 This pattern is typical for all but two of the 
countries of the European Economic Community (see appendix A). Only the United Kingdom 
and Denmark have one rate (other than a zero rate).16
The existence of multiple rates at the retail level discriminates among VAT activities, 
whether or not imposed at prior levels.17 To the extent that the VAT affects profits for a type of 
business activity (that is, because the activity has to bear the incidence of the VAT), differential 
VAT rates would affect decisions to enter or leave the activity and to expand or contract 
operations. The imposition of a reduced rate or a reduction in the tax base in conjunction with 
the standard rate will ordinarily favor the activity.
A rate higher or lower than the standard rate principally affects only the cash flow of fully 
taxable activities if it is imposed at an intermediate stage (or at intermediate stages) and not at 
the retail level.18 In such a case, there is generally a catching-up effect in the next stage(s) and 
the total tax collected is equal to, or approximates, the amount that would have been collected 
if the retail rate had been used for all transactions.19
Zero Rating
The VAT rate at any particular stage can be zero, which in effect imposes no tax on sales but 
grants a credit for a tax on purchases. Because a zero rate is a rate just as is 5 percent or 10 
percent, the effect of a zero rating of domestic sales would depend on the stage at which it is 
imposed. Thus a zero rate at the retail level (or at all levels) of an activity would generally
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remove the VAT from that activity. Zero rating of this nature is used extensively in the United 
Kingdom.20 In contrast, zero rating at levels other than retail would principally give cash flow 
advantages to ta x p a y e rs .21(Zero rating of exports is discussed in the section titled “VAT and 
Foreign Trade.”)
While zero rating is generally applied to sales by an activity, it could also be applied to sales 
to an activity. For example, a sale of expensive medical equipment to an exempt hospital entity 
could be zero rated.2
Backdoor Zero Rating
Goods and services furnished to employees as fringe benefits could be subject to the VAT, as 
could goods and services furnished by a business as gifts or prizes, including advertising 
samples.23 However, these items are in effect zero rated if such goods and services are not 
subject to the VAT when granted, if they would otherwise be subject to the VAT on their 
purchase by the recipient, and if the granting business is given a credit for purchase VAT 
relating thereto.24
An efficient approach to taxing goods and services furnished as employee fringe benefits and 
as business gifts would be to impose the VAT only on employee fringe benefits that are taxed to 
employees and on business gifts in excess of a threshold value such as $25.25 Such an approach, 
however, would encourage the furnishing of those goods and services that are not taxed. In 
particular, this approach would add to the considerable federal income tax advantages of 
advertising gifts that build goodwill26 and of certain employee fringe b e n e f i t s ,27 thereby 
potentially distorting economic decisions.
Cash Flow Effects of the VAT
Significant features of the VAT are the cash flow effects of receipt of sales VAT, the payment 
of purchase VAT, and the remittance of VAT to (or refund by) the government, just as the cash 
flow effects of the timing of income and deductions are significant features of the income tax.
The overall cash flow effects of VAT on businesses will usually be favorable because there is 
generally a delay of remittance of VAT collected. However, the effect of a VAT on each 
taxpayer’s cash flow depends on many factors, including the use of the accrual method or the 
cash method, the length of the taxable period, the time for making remittance of the VAT, the 
amounts of cash purchases and sales, and the amounts and terms of credit purchases and sales.
Accrual vs. Cash
VAT would affect cash flow differently depending on whether the taxpayer determines 
liability for the tax through an accrual method or cash method.28 Under the accrual method, 
the taxpayer is generally liable for VAT on sales no later than the time an invoice is rendered29 
and similarly gets VAT credit on the basis of invoices received. In contrast, under the cash 
method, the taxpayer accounts for sales VAT upon receiving collections but gets no credit for 
purchase VAT until payment is made.
The cash method would be favored under the VAT in circumstances similar to those for the 
income tax. Thus, the cash method might be preferred simply because it ensures that a VAT 
will not have to be remitted to the government until cash is available. The cash method would 
be particularly favorable when there are significant credit sales in comparison with credit 
purchases or when receivables turnover is slower than payables turnover.30 Use of the cash 
method by a taxpayer could therefore affect the taxpayer’s sought terms for sales and purch­
ases. The cash method could have advantages for small business, in part because this method 
may be less costly to use than the accrual method and in part because the cash method could 
confer cash flow advantages and could therefore be made specially available to it.
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The cash flow position of the accrual method taxpayer would depend largely on the credit 
terms of his or her sales and purchases. The accrual method would generally be favorable when 
credit sales are not significant and credit purchases are significant.31 The accrual method 
would also generally be favorable in the case of significant credit sales and purchases, when 
receivables turnover is faster than payables turnover. The accrual method taxpayer would 
have an incentive to compensate for any cash outflow problems by favoring cash sales over 
credit sales or by making credit sales requiring relatively quick payment. Alternatively, in 
some cases the taxpayer might prefer leasing goods to customers over selling. Similarly, the 
taxpayer would be encouraged to make purchases with long payment terms and to defer 
short-term credit purchases and thereby reduce average inventory levels.32
When the buyer and the seller use different methods, the VAT may affect the terms of the 
sale. If  the buyer uses the accrual method and the seller the cash method, the VAT offers the 
buyer a special incentive to make a credit purchase from the seller while offering no compara­
ble incentive to the seller. Conversely, if the buyer uses the cash method and the seller the 
accrual method, the VAT offers the seller a special incentive to make a cash (or short-term 
credit) sale to the buyer while offering no comparable incentive to the buyer.
Bad Debts
Bad debts create a problem under the accrual method because the seller often remits to the 
government the VAT on a credit sale before the seller collects it from the customer. If the 
receivable ultimately proves to be uncollectible, the seller will sustain a real loss unless he or 
she is permitted a refund of the VAT remitted or an allowance credit for estimated uncollecti­
ble taxes on sales. If  such a refund or credit is not permitted, the seller will have an additional 
incentive to modify the terms of all or some sales in order to minimize possible bad-debt losses. 
If  a refund or credit is permitted only if the purchaser becomes bankrupt (formally insolvent), 
as in the United K in g d o m ,3 the seller would have an incentive to force the purchaser into 
bankruptcy.
Deferred Payment Sales and Purchases
The availability of an installment method for remittance of VAT on deferred payment sales 
could affect the frequency of such sales.34 Further, if only certain deferred payment sales 
qualify for the installment method (such as those involving retention of title or of a security 
interest in the property by the seller), there would be an incentive to the seller to make such 
qualifying deferred payment sales in preference to nonqualifying deferred payment sales.
Similarly, the timing of the purchase VAT credit on deferred payment purchases could affect 
the frequency and type of such purchases. If the purchaser is given a present credit for 
purchase VAT on some or all deferred payment purchases, the purchaser will favor the use of 
such purchases.
Of course, any type of deferred payment sale and purchase that qualifies the seller for the 
installment method for VAT on the sale but enables the purchaser to take a present credit for 
VAT on the purchase may be favored by the parties.35
Vertical Integration
An integrated business under one corporate shell might have a cash flow or other advantage 
over competing nonintegrated businesses because it would delay any VAT remittance to the 
government until sales are made to outsiders.36 The cash flow advantages for integrated 
businesses would encourage a business to supply its own taxable goods and services instead of 
purchasing them from third p a r t i e s .37 The VAT could thus be one of the many factors 
encouraging corporate combinations that involve vertical integration.
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Group Registration
Because of the potential cash flow advantage of an integrated business under one corporate 
shell, related businesses are often permitted to elect treatment as one entity for VAT purposes, 
thereby achieving, in effect, a VAT consolidated return.38 If group registration may be made 
only by corporations, and not between an incorporated and an unincorporated business (and if 
only unincorporated businesses with identical ownership may have a single registration), as in 
the United Kingdom,39 there will be an incentive to organize taxable businesses in a form that 
facilitates group registration or treatment as one taxpayer (for example, as corporations). If 
group registration is not permitted, there will be an incentive to avoid multiple corporations 
for a vertically integrated business by the same ownership interests.
Tax Periods
The length of the taxable period and the time thereafter for payment will affect cash flow. In 
the United Kingdom the period is three months, with the return being due within one month 
th e r e a f te r .40 The U.K. approach could give significant cash flow advantages. For example, 
assuming cash sales and purchases are made ratably throughout the tax period, the U.K. 
approach will give the taxpayer two and one-half months’ use of the net tax payable before 
required remittance ((.5 X 3) + 1).
Moreover, an optional shorter period, such as one month (as in the United Kingdom),41 
could be made available for a taxpayer (or affiliated taxpayers under a group registration). Such 
a period would be appropriate if the taxpayer (or group) were typically in a net repayment 
position (that is, his or her credits exceed tax on sales).
An optional shorter period would encourage an individual with two businesses, one typically 
in a net repayment position, to incorporate one of the businesses (or each of the businesses) in 
order to have a short period for the business in a net repayment position and a regular period 
for the other. Similarly, a corporation with two such businesses (as divisions) would be 
encouraged to place one of them in a subsidiary.42 If two group registrations were permitted 
for multiple related corporations (one for those corporations using the standard period and the 
other for those electing the shorter period), as in the United K in g d o m ,43 there would be an 
additional incentive for multiple corporations.44
Exemption
An activity could be exempted from the VAT. This technique is used extensively in the 
United Kingdom to cover both profit-seeking and non-profit-seeking activities such as finance, 
insurance, education, and c h a r it ie s .45 With exemption, as with zero rating, sales are not taxed. 
Unlike zero rating, however, no credit is allowed for taxes paid on purchases; that is, purchase 
VAT credit is denied.
Exempt status may exist other than explicitly. For example, employees generally have an 
exemptlike status because they generally do not charge tax on their services for the employer 
and are not permitted a credit for taxes paid on employment-related purchases. Similarly, if a 
business or other activity is neither required nor allowed to register as a taxpayer, it also has an 
exemptlike status.46
Effect
An exempt or exemptlike status for sales at other than the retail level would hamper an 
activity according to the relative amount of purchase VAT because the business or other 
activity would be forced to absorb, or pass on to any taxable customers, the noncreditable 
purchase VAT.47 As an example, if financing activities are exempted, the financing source
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(whether a bank, an insurance company, a savings and loan association, a pension fund, or an 
individual) and the type of financing (whether equity or debt) that has the smallest VAT on 
purchases to absorb or shift forward is given one type of competitive advantage which could be 
significant. Thus, the VAT could conceivably affect the financing decisions of business firms.48 
Similarly, if leasing is fully taxed but other financing is exempted, another economic distortion 
would be created. Not only might taxable leasing and other (exempt) financing have different 
VAT content in sales to shift forward to purchasers, but the VAT content in leasing would also 
be potentially creditable to business purchasers while the VAT content in other financing 
charges would not be.
An exempt or exemptlike status at retail level probably would not hamper an activity, 
because the retail consumer is not entitled to a credit. Instead, this status at the retail level is 
likely to be advantageous, particularly when the amount of purchase VAT is relatively small 
and labor is a substantial element in the goods or services sold.49
Tax Avoidance
Response by Taxable Customers. Exempt or exemptlike status of an activity would encour­
age its potential taxable custom ers to minimize purchases from it in one or both of the following 
ways: First, taxable potential customers would be encouraged to self-supply to replace all or 
part of potential purchases from the exempt activity. For example, if university graduate 
education is exempt from the VAT, a business might prefer developing its own technical 
education program to receive credit for any VAT on purchases instead of utilizing university 
services that have a VAT content but not in creditable form. Conceivably, a business could also 
be encouraged to finance its activities through retained earnings in place of borrowing funds if 
finance were exempt,50 or to self-insure if insurance were exempt.51
Second, taxable potential customers would also be encouraged to seek a registered (taxable) 
supplier to replace all or part of potential purchases from the nonregistered (exempt) supplier 
and, in particular, to limit the role of the exempt supplier to the furnishing of services with 
minimal VAT content.
Response by Exempt Activity. Exempt or exemptlike status of an activity would encourage 
the activity's tax avoidance in one or more of the following five ways: First, the exempt entity 
would have an incentive to minimize its taxes on purchases of both capital and noncapital items 
by self-supply. For example, an exempt insurance company might furnish its own janitorial 
services instead of hiring an outside concern.52 Self-supply could be discouraged by being 
taxed as a separate activity, but such an approach presents significant difficulties in identifying 
and valuing the self-supply to be taxed.53 In the United Kingdom, until recently only the 
self-supply of printing by exempt activities was subject to taxation.54 However, now that 
nonresidential construction is subject to the VAT in the United Kingdom, the self-supply of 
building services by businesses is also taxed in the United Kingdom.5
Second, the exempt entity would also have an incentive to minimize its taxes on purchases 
by having its customers deal directly with taxable suppliers. The exempt entity would attempt 
to limit its activities to the performance of services on which it has minimal purchase VAT. 
Thus, if insurance is exempt, the insurance company should reimburse the insured for 
damages to property but should not contract for the repair of the property.56 (A variation of this 
technique will be used by employees and by unregistered businesses, as discussed subse­
quently. )
Third, the exempt entity would be encouraged to minimize cash flow problems relating to 
the denial of the credit on necessary capital assets by leasing the assets,57 by deferred payment 
purchases of such assets, or through similar financing techniques. These techniques might be
8
available to defer payment of the denied credit. For example, in a lease to an exempt entity the 
VAT might not affect the lessor s credit for the leased assets. Because the lessee/exempt entity 
will be charged VAT as lease payments are made, there will be a deferred denial of the credit to 
the exempt entity. Similarly, in the deferred payment purchase, the VAT may require the 
seller to remit the VAT only as payments are received, thereby also resulting in a deferred 
denial of the credit.58
Fourth, the exempt entity will be encouraged to acquire high-cost assets by the tax-free 
acquisition of target companies owning those assets, followed perhaps by a lease of the assets 
from the subsidiary to the parent.59 Similarly, the exempt organization could organize a 
taxable subsidiary in the business of leasing such assets and the parent would be one of its 
customers.
Fifth, if an exempt corporation purchases goods or services from a taxable related corpora­
tion, the two will be encouraged to make a group registration (if permitted), to avoid noncredit- 
able tax being charged the exempt corporation by the taxable related corporation. If a group 
registration is not made or permitted, taxable goods and services would undoubtedly be 
supplied at the minimum c h a r g e ;60 there would also be an incentive to combine the taxable 
activities under one corporate shell.
Employees
Because an employee’s employment is not a taxable activity, the employee is not able to 
receive credit for purchase VAT relating to his or her employment (such as VAT arising out of 
(1) purchase of tools and equipment; (2) transportation, meals, and lodging while away from 
home; (3) entertainment; and (4) special uniforms). This treatment of the employee concerning 
employment-related costs could encourage the employee to incorporate his or her economic 
activity, with the corporation incurring the taxable costs. The cases in which such incorpora­
tion would be appropriate and be given tax recognition would not be frequent.61 A VAT could 
affect the form of employer reimbursement or extra compensation for employee costs and 
expenses. It encourages the employer to pay these costs and expenses directly or to reimburse 
the employee in a creditable form,62 rather than doing so indirectly by increasing employee 
salaries or payment in another, noncreditable form.63
Registration
Many VAT systems require registration by only those businesses that reach a threshold level 
of economic activity.64 In the United Kingdom, a taxpayer generally need not register unless 
annual sales reach, or are expected to reach, £23,600 (approximately $39,400).65 Because the 
exemptlike status of nonregistration is generally advantageous at the retail level,66 retail 
businesses can be expected to attempt to avoid registration, particularly when the labor 
content or profit on their goods or services sold is high or when both the labor content and 
profit are high. For example, a business could limit its sales to services and require that its 
customers purchase directly any necessary third-party taxable supplies. This pattern might 
become typical for home improvements and repairs, appliance repairs, and automobile repairs 
performed by independent contractors. As a second example, a retail business selling goods 
could convert to a sales agent status, performing only services for the distributor or supplier. 
Thus, a part-time repairer and seller of used violins would be encouraged to make sales on 
commission and not purchase for resale. As a third example, a manufacturer would be 
encouraged to distribute its products through numerous part-time salespeople selling out of 
their own homes or door-to-door.67 A fourth example involves the division of a business to 
separate a retail activity (which presumably would not need to register because of its size) from 
other activities, either by transfer to a related individual or by incorporation.68
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Prebusiness Costs
A barrier to entry into a new business or to the organization of a business will be created, 
unless prebusiness taxable purchase VAT is creditable.69 Possible prebusiness taxable costs 
would include investigation costs and organization costs.
Partial Exemption
If a taxable person conducts one or more exempt activities in addition to one or more taxable 
activities, purchase VAT credits will have to be apportioned between the taxable (creditable) 
and the exempt (disallowed). The rules for apportionment could affect methods of accounting 
and identification of cost c e n t e r s , 70 either because the taxpayer would like to use similar 
methods for VAT and for financial-managerial purposes or because the government follows the 
taxpayer’s non-VAT approach in determining the VAT result.71 Rules for apportionment 
conceivably could affect such business decisions as whether to form one corporation (partially 
exempt) or two (one exempt and the other taxable).72 Similarly, the availability of a de minimis 
rule that permits full utilization of credits when exempt sales do not exceed a certain propor­
tion of total sales could also affect the form of organization. Further, the use of unsophisticated 
apportionment techniques, such as apportionment based on current year’s sales73 instead of 
eventual use of the purchased goods or services, could encourage timing of purchases so that 
the purchase VAT credit is taken in a favorable year.
Alternative VAT Methods
Certain activities may be permitted or required to use a noncredit VAT form, although 
business may generally use the credit VAT form.74 The permitted or required noncredit VAT 
form would determine VAT liability under one of the following basic formulas:
75VAT Liability = Rate X (Sales — Taxed Purchases) 
or
VAT Liability = Rate X (Profits + Deductions Not Otherwise Subject to VAT)
The effect of such an alternative VAT form when businesses are generally using the credit 
form is to impose one aspect of exemptlike status. The activity has no credit for taxed 
purchases. At the same time, the activity has VAT imposed on its own value added, but in a 
form that does not give rise to a credit to its taxable customers.
The use of a noncredit VAT form by a business at the retail level would theoretically not give 
it a competitive advantage or disadvantage over a taxable competitor using the credit method, 
assuming that the incidence of any VAT imposed remains the same. However, use of a 
noncredit VAT form by a business at a nonretail stage would be especially disadvantageous 
because it would increase the amount of noncreditable VAT.
Use of an alternative VAT form is often permitted to small businesses76 in order to minimize 
administrative and compliance costs. For the reasons noted previously, the election is likely to 
be made only by a business with insubstantial nonretail sales. The form of business organiza­
tion may be dictated by the availability of the election because an owner may set up a retail 
business in a different entity than a nonretail business in order to make the election only for the 
retail business.
Use of an alternative VAT form is required in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 
the case of the EEC business of “tour operators."7 The purpose of this requirement is in part 
to modify the results of the destination principal VATs within the EEC, under which the 
country in which goods and services are purchased for ultimate consumption benefits from all 
the VAT on those goods or services.78 Because of the special status of tour operators, a southern 
European country such as Spain need not grant a credit to a U.K. tour operator for hotel and
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other taxable purchases in Spain. In effect, this required use of the alternative VAT form 
modifies the EEC destination approach in favor of an origin approach. Unfortunately, the 
EEC rules for tour operators apply to their EEC nonretail sales as well as to their EEC retail 
sales, providing incentives for businesses to avoid the noncreditable purchase VAT.
The EEC experience with tour operators may be important for the United States if a federal 
credit-form VAT permits the states to piggyback their own VATs onto the federal VAT and if 
administrative and compliance considerations dictate that a destination principal credit-form 
VAT be used.79 In such a case, the required use of an alternative VAT form by a retail business 
would ensure that its out-of-state purchases would give rise to a VAT that benefits the state of 
its supplier. Such an approach at the retail level might be useful to preserve the revenue of a 
state that is significantly dependent on the manufacture and wholesale distribution of one 
commodity, such as automobiles. It could also be used to preserve the revenue of a state with 
significant hotel bookings.
Used Capital Assets
Because the capital assets of an exempt activity have previously borne VAT (if purchased 
after enactment of the VAT), resale of such assets by the exempt activity raises double-taxation 
problems with accompanying economic distortions. Existing solutions, discussed in chapter 4, 
are not entirely satisfactory.
The Credit
The allowance of a credit for the purchase VAT of a taxable activity is an integral and essential 
part of the credit VAT form. The shaping of the rules for allowance and denial of the credit, 
however, offers considerable flexibility. This flexibility in turn offers considerable opportunity 
for an impact on business decisions. This section will discuss the credit in general, whereas the 
next section will focus on the credit on capital goods.
Excess Credits
Purchase VAT that is potentially allowable as a credit might exceed sales VAT when there 
are zero- or low-rated sales, relatively small standard rated sales, large capital expenditures, 
large inventory purchases, or a combination of these conditions. European practices vary 
considerably in dealing with such excess credits. At one time or another, various countries 
have allowed the excess credit in full as a refund (as in the case of exports generally), allowed it 
in full when it reached a minimum amount, or allowed it only to offset subsequent taxes on 
s a l e s . 80 To minimize fraudulent claims, the taxpayer may be required to have established a 
business history. The credit could conceivably also be carried back to offset the VAT liability of 
prior years and be allowed currently to that extent. In addition, the government could vary 
general treatment of the excess credit according to considerations of overall economic stabi­
lization policy or could favor or penalize particular activities by permitting different treatments 
among activities. It is apparent that deferring use of the credit would present the taxpayer with 
a cash flow problem and encourage the taxpayer to take steps to avoid an excess credit.
If a business with excess credits is organized as a partnership, the excess credits might be 
allowable only to the partnership and its successors. If a conduit theory were utilized, 
however, each partner could offset his or her distributive share of excess tax credit against the 
current tax liability from the partner’s other taxable activities or against the subsequent tax 
liability of the partnership or some other taxable activity. Allowance of a similar credit to the 
shareholders of a corporation would probably not be permissible, except in the case of 
corporations that are comparable to the present S (pass-through) corporations.81 The choice of 
business organization would therefore affect cash flow.
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If an activity with excess credits were organized under the same corporate shell as an activity 
with VAT liability against which the credits could be offset, the corporation would have a cash 
flow advantage over two similarly situated activities organized under separate, related cor­
porations and over two similarly situated unrelated corporations. Thus, unless related corpora­
tions could obtain a current offset through a group registration privilege, there would be an 
incentive under the VAT to combine all activities under one corporate shell. Unrelated 
corporations and other entities would still not enjoy the cash flow advantage available to 
related corporations and other entities unless the system did not allow the offsetting of excess 
credits against liabilities either among the divisions of a corporation or among related corpora­
tions.
A related problem is whether it should be permissible to acquire a corporation in order to 
take advantage of its deferred credit potential. To allow use of the credit in these circumstances 
would encourage corporate acquisitions.
The form of business organization might affect the ultimate allowance of a deferred credit 
arising out of an excess credit or out of an unamortized credit from a capital acquisition. If a 
corporation has such a credit, the death of a shareholder would not seem to affect the ultimate 
allowance of the credit, yet termination of the business and dissolution of the corporation 
probably would. On the other hand, if an individual has a deferred credit through a prop­
rietorship or a partnership, the individual’s death would seem to affect the ultimate allowance 
of the credit but a change in business activities probably would not. The problem in part is 
whether an excess credit can be assigned to specific property and, if so, whether transfer of the 
property should also transfer the excess credit when consideration for the transfer might or 
might not be involved. A similar problem arises with a change of the organizational form of a 
business (for example, the incorporation of a partnership). Failure to allow the new organiza­
tion the benefit of a potential credit will discourage changes in the form of organization.
Delayed Credits
Purchase VAT could be delayed as a credit. Under one approach, purchase VAT would not 
be creditable at the time paid or incurred, but only after a specified period, such as one week or 
one month.82 Such a lag in credit would confer a cash flow advantage on the government and 
could be imposed generally for budgetary reasons or selectively for various reasons. Under 
another delayed credit approach, purchase VAT of an accrual method taxpayer would be 
creditable only when paid, as in the case of a deferred payment purchase. This approach might 
be used to ensure that a purchaser and his or her seller were using the same timing rules for the 
VAT on the transaction. Delayed credits would generally present the same problems and 
opportunities as excess credits not presently allowable.
Denied Credits
Credits on certain taxed purchases of an entity could be denied. There could be a denial of a 
credit for purchase VAT on taxed expenses (in contrast to a capital costs) (1) in pursuit of a social 
policy to discourage incurring of the expense, (2) in recognition of substantial personal 
enjoyment in such expense and the difficulty of separating profit seeking from pleasure, (3) in 
an attempt to offset favorable income tax treatment, or (4) for a combination of these reasons. In 
the United Kingdom, for example, purchase VAT on entertainment expense does not qualify 
for the credit,83 perhaps because the United Kingdom recognizes the substantial personal 
enjoyment in entertainment.
The denial of a credit for purchase VAT on an expense creates an incentive for taxpayers to 
avoid the expense, to self-supply the goods and services involved so as to minimize denied 
credits, or both.
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Limited Credit Amount
In narrow circumstances, it would be appropriate to limit the amount of the credit of an 
activity for its purchase VAT either for all costs or for expenses. Limitations on credit amounts 
arising out of a covered activity carried on by a taxpayer would be imposed even though the 
taxpayer does not have excess credits from all taxable activities.
The limiting of the credit amount in an activity might be useful if profit-seeking motives do 
not or may not predominate, as in agriculture, horse breeding, horse racing, and automobile 
racing. For example, in a case in which a ranch is carried on as a hobby, the credit for purchase 
VAT on expenses (but not capital items) could be limited to a percentage of sales (such as 80 
percent), which percentage would be set by statute or regulations and based on the assumed 
ratio of purchase VAT to sale VAT in similar businesses carried on for profit. Excess potential 
credits for purchase VAT on expenses would not carry over. Credit for purchase VAT on capital 
items might also be limited to sale VAT, reduced by purchase VAT on expenses, but could 
carry over to subsequent years.
The limited credit amount rewards efficient operators and penalizes inefficient ones. It also 
penalizes operators who have low receipts because of conditions beyond their control. The 
limit, if set high, could encourage investment in an activity, at least in the short run. If set low, 
it could discourage investment in the activity at least in the short run.
Substituted Credit
A similar approach would be to impute a credit as a substitute for the credit on actual 
purchase VAT on expenses or all costs of an activity. For example, EEC countries are 
authorized by EEC law to base a farmer’s credit on a percentage of the farmer’s sales regardless 
of the presence or absence of a predominant profit-seeking motive.84 Such a credit replaces the 
actual credit.
A substituted credit would generally seek to approximate the purchase VAT on expense (or 
on all costs) based on industry experience for the entire industry or for broad groupings within 
the industry (by size or product). The substitute is thus a grant of a credit. Although the credit 
granted could limit an activity, it could also be larger than the actual purchase VAT covered.
The effect of the substituted credit on taxpayers and their behavior would be similar to that 
of the limited credit.
Additional Imputed Credit
It is feasible in a VAT system to grant an imputed credit to taxpayers. The VAT system could 
allow an imputed credit in a variety of situations. The first of these situations is an imputed 
credit for purchases from  an exem pt stage. An imputed credit can be employed to alleviate 
certain problems associated with exemption of an activity from the VAT at stages other than the 
retail stage. Because the VAT on purchases by an exempt activity is not creditable to it, it may 
seek to shift this cost forward to its customers. Granting an imputed credit to customers of the 
exempt activity is one technique to keep the customer of the exempt activity from absorbing 
the noncreditable VAT content of his or her purchases from the activity and to make the 
customer willing to pay a purchase price that includes the noncreditable VAT content.85
European countries have used such a technique when agriculture is an exempt activity,86 
but the technique could also be used for other exempt activities such as insurance. In the 
context of agriculture, the processor who purchases agricultural products from an exempt 
farmer receives an imputed credit representing the estimated VAT paid on the products by the 
exempt farmer. This imputed credit could be unrealistically high, with the intention of 
subsidizing production of food. Varying the rate of the imputed credit from time to time could 
affect the price paid to farmers and thereby encourage them to sell their produce or hold it for 
future sale. In addition, if the farmer does not obtain a direct tax credit but would perhaps get
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an indirect benefit from the imputed credit, the farmer would be encouraged to delay payment 
of VAT on purchases of productive assets by lease or deferred payment purchases and to 
minimize taxes on purchases through self-supply. The system might even give established 
farmers a competitive advantage over those entering farming or expanding existing operations 
or give efficient farmers a competitive advantage over inefficient ones.
Although an imputed credit that was generally available to businesses purchasing from an 
exempt stage might discourage the purchasing business from self-supply, it probably would 
not entirely prevent the tendency of exempt entities to delay imposition of taxes on purchases 
or to self-supply.
Second, an imputed credit could be granted to encourage certain classes o f  expenditures. 
Such an imputed credit, in addition to the regular purchase VAT, would encourage incurring 
of costs giving rise to the credit, at least in the short run. Examples of such potential credits 
include—
• Wages expended for research and experimentation.
• Discovery value in mineral properties.
• Rehabilitation of low-cost housing or historical structures.
• Wages paid to the hard-core unemployed.
• Payments to retirement plans.87
This class of imputed credit would be essentially equivalent in function to the various income 
tax credits.
Third, an imputed credit could be used to prom ote progressiveness in the VAT. For 
example, progressiveness could be sought through the grant of a credit to a taxable employer 
for his or her reimbursement to an employee of the employee’s social security taxes on a 
specified amount of wages.
Finally, an imputed credit could be used to avoid double taxation on used goods.
Used Consumer Goods
Many taxable businesses deal in, and even rebuild, used consumer goods such as auto­
mobiles, refrigerators, violins, computers, and automobile parts. The imposition of a fu ll VAT 
on resale by a business will potentially discriminate against used goods and in favor of new 
goods, assuming that these goods had previously been taxed under the VAT. An imputed 
credit and several other solutions (discussed in chapter 4) are possible to avoid or mitigate 
double-taxation problems, but these solutions are not entirely satisfactory.
Failure to prevent double taxation on used consumer goods will encourage tax avoidance in 
many cases. For example, the business otherwise purchasing and reselling the used goods will 
be encouraged to render any services on behalf of the original owner (for example, to take the 
goods on consignment or as a selling agent).
Capital Goods
The purchase VAT on business and investment capital expenditures and on consumer 
durable goods presents special problems.
In General
In the European countries employing a VAT system, economic policy considerations 
generally dictate the allowance of a credit for purchase VAT on business and investment capital 
expenditures.88 The credit encourages expansion of capital facilities, thereby stimulating
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economic growth. Such a credit also serves to remove a potential discrimination against new 
capital goods vis-a-vis old capital goods, although the discrimination could also be avoided by 
imposing the tax on capital goods that exist when the VAT is adopted.
Credit Denial
The power to grant or deny a credit on capital expenditures for business and investment 
purposes is a significant aspect of VAT flexibility and hence a potential source of nonneutral 
economic impact.89 A denial of the credit on all capital goods would clearly discourage their 
acquisition. This might be done deliberately for a number of reasons (for example, to dampen 
inflationary pressures on the economy).
A denial of the credit on selected capital goods is also a possibility.90 Political pressures 
emanating from loss of jobs in a particular industry due to mechanization might lead to 
selective denial of the credit. Such a denial is also a possibility for the same reasons given for a 
denial of the credit on purchase VAT on selected expenses. In the United Kingdom, for 
example, purchase VAT on automobiles and on entertainment facilities acquired for use and 
not for resale is denied,91 apparently to avoid distinguishing between business and personal 
use,92 to raise additional revenue, and (in the case of automobiles) to offset favorable income 
tax rules. In the United Kingdom, the denied credit technique is therefore used sparingly. The 
denied credit technique could be used in the United States to deal with costs that have mixed 
business and personal uses, involve considerable VAT or income tax avoidance or evasion, or 
include both characteristics.
Denial of the credit on purchase VAT for selected capital expenditures would encourage 
firms to take a number of s t e p s . 93 One step would be for firms to construct their own capital 
assets if such self-supply is not subject to VAT. In the United Kingdom the self-supply of 
automobiles is subject to VAT, but certain improvements thereto are not. Furthermore, the 
self-supply of certain construction services is subject to VAT in the United Kingdom.94
Another step would be for firms to purchase used assets, assuming that the used goods are 
not subject to a second tax, with the effect that used goods would become more valuable. If 
used goods were subject to a second VAT, firms would be encouraged to enter into exchanges 
of equity interests for capital assets, unless these transactions were subject to the VAT, and 
such reorganizations could have as much tax significance under a VAT system as under the 
present income tax system.95
As another step, firms could lease goods, assuming that the lessor’s credit is not denied. 
Credit denial to the user would thus be deferred until rentals are paid. Therefore, the lessor’s 
credit should also be denied. In the United Kingdom, for example, the lessor’s credit on 
purchase VAT for automobiles is denied. Nevertheless, the full denial of credit for purchase 
VAT on business automobiles in the United Kingdom has provided businesses with an 
increased incentive for leasing, rather than purchasing, automobiles. Such denial increases 
the price cost advantage of any discount given lessors for volume purchases by the rate of the 
VAT. If a business firm could purchase an automobile for $10,000 and a lessor could purchase 
the same automobile for $9,000, assuming a VAT of 15 percent, the firm’s purchase VAT would 
be $1,500 while the lessor’s would be only $1,350. The lessor’s price advantage has thus been 
increased by $150 to $1,150.
A final step for firms to consider would be to minimize the cash flow problems that result 
from denial of the credit through installment purchases and similar financing arrangements.
Amortization
If a credit is allowed for purchase VAT on capital purchases, it could be currently allowed as 
an offset to tax liability or it could be amortized over the estimated life of the property or some 
other period.96 Amortization of the credit would generate nonneutral effects similar to those
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resulting from a denial of the credit97 and would also create the problem of determining proper 
amortization methods.
Amortization of the credit for purchase VAT on capital expenditures over the life of the 
property or some other period might be required in one or more of the following situations:
• If the property is used in both exempt and taxable activities, the purchase VAT could be 
allocated between the creditable and the noncreditable uses by requiring amortization 
over some period and apportioning each year’s amortized purchase VAT according to the 
relative use of the property in that year.
• In cases of likely (or even possible) personal use, amortization of the purchase VAT and 
apportionment between personal and taxable activities could be required.98
• The government might use long-term amortization of the purchase VAT to discourage 
capital expenditures, as part of an anti-inflation policy or because of pressure from 
organized labor.
If the credit were generally allowed only over the life of the property, the government could 
use current allowance or accelerated amortization in specific cases to encourage an activity.
Changed Use
Dealing with changes in the use of capital assets will challenge the VAT and potentially give 
rise to complex rules. Capital assets might be held for (1) initial exempt or personal use, giving 
rise to no credit for purchase VAT on acquisition; (2) initial taxable (business or investment) 
use, giving rise to full credit on acquisition; or (3) mixed initial use, giving rise to partial credit 
on acquisition. Change of initial use is relatively common. An exempt domestic insurance 
company may convert an office building from exempt to taxable rental use, or vice versa. A 
person may convert a residence from personal to taxable use, or vice versa.
It is generally assumed that the VAT will grant a credit for purchase VAT based on initial use 
of property. Failure to recognize changed use will discriminate among properties and tax­
payers, thereby making the VAT nonneutral, and will encourage significant attempts at tax 
avoidance. Under the current credit approach, failure to recapture a credit when taxable use of 
property declines in relation to exempt or personal use would discriminate against exempt or 
personal use property that had never been converted. Taxpayers would be encouraged to 
acquire property for initial taxable use with the plan to convert the property to exempt or 
personal use at a later date. Similarly, under the current credit approach, failure to grant a 
credit when exempt or personal use of property declines in relation to taxable use would 
discriminate against that property. This discrimination, among other things, would discourage 
persons from acquiring full ownership of property if initial exempt or personal use might 
change. In these circumstances, a person would be encouraged to acquire use of property by 
lease instead of purchase or by lease with option to purchase. The transaction might even be 
structured so that a related party purchases the property for lease.
There is no simple solution to the problem of changed use of capital assets. In the United 
Kingdom, the problem of changed use was ignored for a period. After almost twenty years of 
experience with the VAT in the United Kingdom, a satisfactory basic solution to the problem is 
not readily apparent and is being debated.99 Solutions discussed in chapter 4 are not entirely 
satisfactory.
Used Capital Goods
When used capital goods of a business are sold, these goods should ordinarily be subject to 
VAT at that time. However, if purchase VAT credit was denied on the original purchase of a 
capital asset (see previous section titled “Denied Credits”), imposition of a VAT on its
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subsequent sale could give rise to double taxation. Such double taxation will discriminate 
against such a used capital asset, with attendant economic distortions. Potential solutions, 
discussed in chapter 4, are not entirely satisfactory.
The VAT and Foreign Trade
European nations that employ a VAT system in effect zero rate exports so that these 
products do not bear the VAT of the exporting country.10 The VAT does apply to the purchase 
price (including freight and custom duties) of imports.10 The VAT on imports is therefore 
approximately the same as the VAT on local goods of the same price. The implementation of 
the destination principle (the country of destination and not the country of origin of the goods 
collects the tax) is achieved through the zero rating of exports, coupled with the full imposition 
of VAT on imports. A country following an origin principle would, conversely, tax exports but 
not imports and would grant a credit for all or part of any VAT taxes paid to another country on 
imported goods.
Some proponents of the VAT have argued that the replacement of the corporate income tax 
with a VAT system would improve the U.S. balance of t r a d e . 102 This dubious conclusion 
follows from partial equilibrium analysis on the assumption that the U.S. corporate income tax 
is shifted to the consumer. In the general equilibrium context, it is not clear what effects the 
VAT has on a nation’s trade balance.103 The VAT does, however, offer a means by which the 
United States can attempt to affect the balance of trade by various bits of tinkering. The United 
States could penalize selected exports, for example, by application of a nonzero rate or by 
exemption. It could favor exports by zero rating purchases of goods and services by export 
houses, in effect giving a cash flow advantage.
Similarly, the United States could encourage or discourage imports by selective variation of 
the applicable VAT rate to a product line dominated by foreign sellers, such as caviar, wigs, 
and chromium. It could also encourage or discourage imports by the required time of payment 
of the VAT on imports. Because the VAT on imports by a business is creditable, any charge of 
such a VAT will principally affect cash flow. Thus, a failure to charge VAT on imports by a 
business, or the deferral of such a charge until the imports are resold, may give the imported 
product a cash flow advantage over the competing domestic product. Conversely, the imposi­
tion and required payment of VAT immediately upon import may give the imported product a 
cash flow disadvantage.
The availability of a procedure for avoiding VAT on goods imported for further processing 
(whether or not for domestic resale) and the resulting cash flow advantage may encourage (or at 
least not discourage) location of such processing activities in the United States.
Significant discretion apparently exists in the treatment of services. For example, the U.K. 
VAT, based on the E E C ’s Sixth Directive, zero rates exports of services of a specified nature 
but not of others and generally taxes imports of services of only the same nature. Although 
this approach could be justified on the grounds that the specified services are of the type most 
likely to be imported or exported, only the specified services are taxed by the United Kingdom 
under a destination principle. The remainder of the services are taxed under an origin 
principle.
Because a U.S. VAT would be free105 to adopt a destination principle or an origin principle 
for exports and imports of services, or a mixture of the two as in the United Kingdom (or even a 
destination principle for imports of services and an origin principle for all or part of exports), 
the approach chosen could favor one type of import or export of services over another and 
perhaps affect the composition of exports and imports of goods and services. If one assumes 
that the VAT is unlikely to affect the level of imports and exports, but only the composition 
thereof, Congress has a fiscal weapon of considerable importance.
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A VAT Favoring Small Business
The VAT is sufficiently flexible to be structured to favor small business. A VAT system 
might, for example, cover or exempt small retail businesses at the election of each business. 
Although exempting a small retail business would deny the business a credit for taxes on 
purchases, its sales would not be subject to the tax. The retail business would therefore have to 
shift forward to the customers only its taxes on purchases and not a larger tax on sales. A VAT 
system could also favor small business by zero rating both sales to and sales by small 
businesses.106 Zero rating the purchases of a business would mean that the business would not 
have the disadvantage of cash outflow for taxes on purchases. Zero rating the sales of a business 
would mean that customers would not be required to pay for the tax on those sales, which 
could give the small business a selling advantage over other businesses. In addition, a VAT 
system could favor small business (to the extent subject to the VAT) by permitting each small 
business to elect to use the cash method, thereby potentially affecting its cash flow 
favorably.107
An Industry Example
Consideration of a particular activity— exploration and development of oil and gas wells—  
will further illustrate the potential nonneutrality of a VAT system. The VAT could be struc­
tured to encourage such exploration and development by allowing a current credit for all taxes 
on purchases for exploration and development. The system could allow an imputed credit 
several percentage points above the actual tax rate and could grant the credit currently, even 
though it is in excess of tax liability. An imputed credit, amortized over the life of the well, for 
the discovery value of a producing well, could also be used. A similar rule could apply to the 
amortization of an imputed credit on the value of producing wells in existence when the VAT 
was enacted. The system could allow a taxpayer who purchased a producing well after 
enactment of a VAT a credit for the VAT on the purchase and could give the taxpayer the 
alternative of receiving the credit immediately or amortizing it over the life of the property. To 
avoid the complexity of valuing the producing property to determine the allowable tax credit, 
the system could reduce the taxable base on sales of petroleum products by some percentage 
or subject sales of petroleum products to lower rates than the standard rate.  Such a scheme 
would encourage the exploration and development of oil and gas wells, at least in the short run, 
and would play a role quite similar to that played by the preferences the present income tax 
laws108 grant the oil and gas industry.
Conclusion
while the VAT in theory is a neutral tax, Congress might take advantage of its flexibility to 
mold it into a highly nonneutral tax. Many of the potential effects on operating, financing, and 
organizing decisions of business firms that are described in the foregoing pages would char­
acterize a U.S. VAT system in such a case. Nevertheless, Congress could make a deliberate 
effort to shape the implementing rules and regulations to avoid a major impact on business 
decisions, to operate efficiently, and to have other desirable attributes.
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Chapter 2
DESIGN CRITERIA FOR A VAT
The following objectives (including economic neutrality and efficiency) for a U.S. VAT, in 
possible order of importance, are suggested for consideration:109
1. Adequate tax yield.10
2. Realistic tax burden— the imposition of a burden that can be conveniently paid by 
consumers and remitted by business and that is not so excessive as to encourage 
substantial distortion of the VAT base through taxpayer avoidance or encourage the 
search for legislative preferences.
3. Cost efficiency— the minimization of government administrative costs and taxpayer 
compliance costs.1
4. Effective prevention of tax avoidance.
5. Economic neutrality— a minimal distortion of economic decisions through the tax.
6. Fairness— similar treatment of similarly situated taxpayers.
7. Design and administration of the VAT to foster taxpayer attitudes that the VAT is a fair 
and efficient tax.
8. Accomplishment of social, economic, and political goals.12
These objectives are often conflicting. For example, if extensive use is made of the VAT to 
accomplish social, economic, and political objectives, accomplishment of many of the other 
objectives may be impossible.
The value of cost efficiency, anti-avoidance effectiveness, and perception of fairness in the 
design criteria will be recognized by certified public accountants (CPAs) and others concerned 
with tax administration and compliance.
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Chapter 3
DESIGNING FOR COST EFFICIENCY
A principal goal for any VAT for the United States will undoubtedly be that it be efficient, 
thereby minimizing the government’s administrative costs, taxpayer compliance costs, and 
other problems. Efficiency in a U. S. VAT is particularly desirable because this VAT apparently 
would not replace the complex federal income tax on corporations and individuals. Nor would 
the enactment of a VAT be used as a justification for removing any layers of complexity in the 
federal income tax. Efficiency in a U.S. VAT is desirable also because the VAT has consider­
able potential for complexity (see chapter 1). If a VAT is designed with efficiency as a goal, 
perhaps the VAT could escape the fate of the present federal income tax, which is overwhelm­
ingly complex and riddled with special provisions. Moreover, if incentives or other special 
provisions incorporating social, political, or economic objectives are to be adopted, the most 
efficient alternatives could be used (see chapter 4).
It is not certain that efficiency will begin and remain as a clear and principal objective of a 
U.S. VAT,113 but if a VAT is adopted in the United States, CPAs will work for efficiency in a 
U.S. VAT.14
Accordingly, the following approaches are suggested for design and administration of a U. S. 
VAT. Many of these suggestions are based on chapter 1, and the discussion of overlapping 
parts will be brief.
Special Provisions
The use of special provisions, other than those necessary to preserve economic neutrality or 
prevent distortion of the VAT base through tax avoidance, should be minimized.15 Special 
provisions exact a heavy price by increasing the costs of compliance and administration, 
creating opportunities for the wary and traps for the unwary, and generally complicating the 
VAT. Several of these special provisions are discussed subsequently.
Rates
There should generally be only one rate (in addition to the zero rate).116 This standard rate 
should not be so high as to encourage excessive tax avoidance. However, a compelling case for 
multiple rates can be made to establish a low rate on an activity in lieu of exempting the activity 
(see chapter 4).
Zero Rating and Exemption
These should be used sparingly.17 Zero rating and exemption may be justifiable to mini­
mize the impact of the VAT on lower-income groups or to deal with situations (such as
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insurance118 and banking119) in which the VAT would arguably be difficult to apply.120 Other 
situations, in which exempt status should be considered, exist when the activity has both 
business and nonbusiness (exempt) customers and its purchase VAT is not significant in 
relation to its total sales (for example, postal services and insurance) or when the activity 
involves a large number of small suppliers and the purchase VAT of each is generally not 
significant.12
Credits
The credit for a purchase VAT of a profit-seeking activity should generally be granted 
currently. Deferral of granting of the credit should be imposed largely to prevent tax avoidance 
or evasion. Other special credit treatments should be used sparingly (such as denying the 
credit for purchase VAT on selected purchases or granting a substituted credit or an additional 
credit).
Tax Periods
The tax period should be short enough so that the government receives its revenues 
currently and taxpayers do not need to wait an unnecessarily long time for refunds.12 It is 
relatively easy for each taxpayer to know his or her position currently because the credit 
method VAT is not based on profits but on tax imposed on sales and purchases. A tax period of 
three months should generally be imposed, with a one-month period required for taxable 
persons with poor compliance records and for larger businesses and available for others on an 
elective basis. However, the shorter the tax periods offered, the greater the likelihood of 
increased administrative and compliance costs.
For businesses filing for periods of three months or less, there need not be estimated taxes as 
under the federal income tax. In this connection, use of a short period will generally be more 
efficient than use of a one-year period with provisions for payment of estimated taxes. For the 
smallest businesses, however, a one-year period could be available, perhaps with estimated 
VAT prepayments.123
The staggering of tax periods, and thus the staggering of the receipt and processing of 
returns, could ensure a smooth flow of work for the administrative agency and thereby reduce 
administrative costs.124
Timing
Timing results under the VAT should generally be correlated with timing results under the 
income tax; that is, the time for reporting a sale or a purchase under the VAT should be the 
same as the time for reporting the comparable income or expense under the federal income 
tax, and vice versa.125
Special rules may have to be fashioned that limit use of the installment method for reporting 
sales so that the sellers’ timing for reporting the sales VAT is the same as the buyers’ timing for 
claiming credits for the purchase VAT. Moreover, special rules may have to be fashioned that 
limit an accrual method purchaser’s claiming of credit for VAT on a purchase from a related 
cash method seller.126
If it is to be a goal that the federal income tax and the VAT follow similar timing rules, one 
important timing issue involves the role of the invoice in determining the timing of a sale and 
purchase under these taxes. The invoice has historically had an important and even central
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timing role in a credit method VAT. It is generally agreed, however, that a credit method VAT 
need not give central importance to invoices and could function based on rules comparable to 
the income tax rules.127 Correlation of the federal income tax and VAT timing rules would 
probably save substantial administrative and compliance c o s t s . 128 Because federal income tax 
timing rules are already in place and are generally understood by taxpayers and their advisers, 
these rules should generally govern for VAT purposes.
Records
A related issue is the role of the invoice as part of a taxpayer’s required records. Under credit 
method VATs, taxpayers have been required to acquire and preserve invoices as the basis for a 
purchase VAT credit and to issue invoices in sales to businesses and when requested in retail 
sales. The rationale for this emphasis on invoices is that they leave an ideal audit trail. The 
issuance of an invoice is also a clear indication that a sale and a purchase have occurred for 
timing purposes. Because invoices are issued in almost all commercial transactions, such a 
record-keeping requirement need not be unduly burdensome if the information required is 
reasonable. The principal burden imposed by placing central emphasis on invoices involves 
the preservation of invoices and use of the invoices on audit. However, a credit method VAT 
can function based on each taxpayer’s accounting books and records under rules similar to 
those under the federal income tax.130 Such a system probably would not impose dispro­
portionate administrative costs and could result in substantial savings in compliance costs.
To the extent that invoices are required to be issued and kept, it is desirable that information 
required be limited and not be overly broad.13
Definitions
Efficiency will also be promoted when VAT definitions are clear and workable. These 
definitions should be based on commonly held concepts and distinctions when possible.
VAT definitions should also be based on concepts that have professional understanding, 
such as concepts developed in the federal income tax, in accounting under generally accepted 
accounting principles, and in the customs law.132 For example, if it is necessary to distinguish 
between a repair and a capital expenditure, between personalty and realty, between profit 
seeking and non-profit seeking, or between an employee and an independent contractor, the 
considerable body of law under the federal income tax could be drawn upon.
Registration
Under one view, to promote the efficiency of a VAT, persons below a minimum threshold of 
gross receipts (for example, $50,000 or $100,000) should not be required or permitted to 
register.13 The argument against their registration is that compliance costs of persons with low 
gross receipts will be relatively high for the amount of revenue collected, as will be administra­
tive costs. However, if books and records required for the VAT will be the same as for federal 
income tax, these additional costs might not be as large as first appears.
Other considerations, both tax and nontax, favor a low threshold for required registration. 
For example, if a person is neither required nor permitted to register, that person will have an 
exemptlike status that is VAT-advantageous to retail business and VAT-disadvantageous to 
others. Competition will potentially be distorted. Further, the exemptlike status encourages 
VAT avoidance by the unregistered person as well as by that person’s taxable customers. There
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will also be additional administrative and compliance costs as a person moves in or out of 
registered status, unless the threshold for required registration is relatively low.134
In addition, the existence of a threshold minimum for required registration is likely to be a 
trap for nonregistered persons who unwittingly exceed the threshold and are thus held 
responsible for uncollected VAT on sales.
Moreover, the fact that a person is not registered because of not meeting a threshold may be 
perceived by potential customers as an indication that his or her activities are only marginally 
successful, and such a person will be concerned about this perception. Lawyers, engineers, 
accountants, and other professionals may be especially desirous of registering.
The foregoing considerations weigh in favor of broad required registration, perhaps with an 
exemption for persons with only a nominal amount of annual gross receipts (for example, 
$2,500). Regardless of the threshold level for required registration, voluntary registration 
should be permitted.135
If the required registration threshold is low (for example, $2,500), consideration should be 
given to sharing of VAT revenues with low-volume traders (for example, 20 percent of the 
amount otherwise remitted), with the sharing percentage dropping as gross receipts 
increase.136 On the other hand, if the required registration threshold is high (for example, 
$100,000 in annual gross receipts), consideration should be given to imposing a charge for 
voluntary registration.
Group registration should be permitted both in the parent-subsidiary corporation rela­
tionship and in the brother-sister corporation relationship. Further, if the required threshold 
for registration is set relatively high (for example, $100,000 in annual gross receipts), activities 
of related persons not filing as a group should be aggregated in determining whether the 
threshold has been met.
Administrative Agency
The IRS is clearly the administrative agency that should be given primary responsibility for 
administration of a federal VAT,137 but it must be given adequate resources. The IRS already 
deals with most persons subject to VAT registration through the federal income tax and has the 
necessary experience with audits and record keeping. Selection of the IRS would enable the 
government to centralize computer capability in one system for both the VAT and the federal 
income tax. Moreover, selection of the IRS may work for common timing rules and definitions 
for the federal income tax and the VAT.
However, other agencies could be given responsibility for administration of the VAT in 
limited areas. For example, U.S. Customs could administer the VAT on the import and export 
of goods.
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Chapter 4
USE OF VARIOUS SPECIAL PROVISIONS 
(EFFICIENCY AND ANTI-AVOIDANCE)
Special provisions will undoubtedly be introduced into a VAT to deal with theoretically 
difficult activities; to promote social, economic, or political objectives; or to deal with tax 
avoidance. This chapter evaluates selected special provisions, based largely on the criteria of 
efficiency and of effective avoidance prevention.
Difficult Coverage: Exemption or Low Rates
Exemption is one alternative for dealing with a business activity presenting difficult cover­
age problems (for example, banking or insurance).138 However, exemption is particularly 
undesirable in comparison with low or zero rating. Although both approaches involve no or low 
tax charged on sales, only exemption denies the input tax credit. For that reason, exemption 
spawns substantial tax avoidance planning and the complexity resulting from administrative 
and legislative responses thereto. The need for tax planning, and in turn its complexity, create 
a situation in which the sophisticated are rewarded and the unwary may be penalized. 
Moreover, to the extent that a nonretail business is exempt, a consumers tax falls on such a 
business. Finally, if the VAT denies purchase VAT credits on certain expenditures (such as 
automobiles and entertainment), exemption destroys the effect of such limited credit denial as 
to the exempt activity.
In contrast, low or zero rates for an activity do not spawn substantial tax avoidance planning 
and could be used as an alternative to exemption. The VAT rate could be set at a level that 
would collect approximately the same revenue as exemption, but without the distortions 
following exemption.139 For example, if exemption were being considered for domestic life 
insurance, the revenue to be collected from life insurance under the exemption approach 
could be estimated (that is, the noncreditable purchase VAT of life insurance companies). In 
place of exemption, a low VAT rate could be set on premiums on domestic life insurance risks 
which, after any purchase VAT credit for business, would approximate the revenue to be 
collected if the coverage of such risks were exempted.140
A Favored Activity or Product: Exemption, Zero or Low Rate, 
or Imputed Credit
Under a VAT, the favoring of an activity or product might be sought to lessen the burden of 
the tax on low-income persons. In such a case, zero (or low) rates for the activity or product are 
clearly more efficient than exemption for the reasons noted previously.
The favoring of an activity might also be sought to encourage the activity or expand or 
increase its investment. In such a case, low or zero rates for the activity are a possibility.
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However, an additional imputed credit may be preferable. The additional imputed credit 
would be more likely to be retained and used within the activity than would the benefits from a 
low or zero rate, at least for the short term. Further, the additional imputed credit would be 
easier to change by legislation than a low or zero rate because the former is more likely to be 
perceived as a benefit to the activity than as a subsidy to the consumer. Moreover, because the 
additional imputed credit acts on the activity and not the consumer, it would be relatively 
simple to vary the terms of the credit (for example, to phase it out after expenditures reach a 
specified level or to base it on increase in expenditures). However, the relative efficiency of the 
two approaches is not entirely clear in that, depending on the facts, it might be easier to 
identify a class of sales (on which a low or zero rate is imposed) than to identify a class of 
expenditures (on which an additional imputed credit is based), or vice versa.
A Disfavored Activity or Product: Denied Credits
An activity or product might be disfavored under the VAT for various reasons, and differing 
VAT techniques could be applied. In the following discussion we will deal with a business 
property or activity in which there is a likelihood of substantial personal use or satisfaction. 
When the mixed use (that is, partly business use and partly exempt or personal use) cannot 
easily be separated between business and exempt or personal, consideration should be given 
to denying VAT credit on purchases from that activity or of that product.14 The credit denial 
approach for such mixed use property is more compelling when it counterbalances favorable 
income tax treatment.
Under the credit denial approach, only the purchaser for resale is permitted a credit. 
Therefore, in the case of automobiles, the business purchasing an automobile for its own use or 
for lease would be denied a credit for purchase VAT.142 The credit denial approach has worked 
relatively efficiently in the United Kingdom in the limited areas applied: automobiles and 
entertainment.143
When it is relatively easy to separate business from personal use with mixed use property, 
an allocation should generally be made and the credit granted or recaptured under the rules 
described hereinafter. Such an allocation is particularly desirable if the mixed use property has 
a significant cost.
Changed Use: Recaptured or Additional Credit
To deal with the changed use of capital assets, rules will have to be fashioned, either upon 
enactment of the VAT or at a later date when problems become insufferable.144 These rules 
will be among the more complicated for the VAT. The potential complexity of these rules may 
in turn lead to efforts to restrict their applicability.145
Initial Exempt or Personal Use
The change of use could be from exempt or personal use to taxable (business or investment) 
use, as, for example, in the conversion by a domestic insurance company of an office building 
from exempt use to taxable rental use.146 Failure to grant a current or deferred credit upon 
such conversion of property in these circumstances would discriminate against such property, 
assuming that there was previously noncreditable purchase VAT. This discrimination, among 
other things, would discourage persons from full ownership of property if initial exempt or 
personal use might change. A person would therefore be encouraged to acquire use of 
property by lease instead of purchase or by lease with an option to purchase. The transaction
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might even be structured so that a related party purchases the property for lease to the 
intended user.
Several techniques could be used if a grant o f a current or deferred credit on conversion from 
exempt or personal use to taxable use is desired. The following example illustrates the 
techniques:
A n exem pt insurance com pany acquired its headquarters building for $10 m illion and paid $ 1 .5
m illion (at 15 percent) o f noncreditable purchase V A T . After ten years o f use out o f an estim ated
useful life o f forty years, the com pany changed the use o f the building from exem pt to rental use.
The building was worth $8 m illion net o f purchase V A T  at the tim e o f the conversion.
The amount o f  the credit could be determined upon conversion under one o f the following 
techniques:
• Fair-m arket-value technique. The credit could be based on the lesser o f the amount o f 
the original purchase VAT ($1.5 million in the preceding exampl)147  or the amount o f 
the purchase VAT that would be charged on the current value o f the property ($1.2 
million) (that is, 15 percent X  $ 8  million).
• Earning-out technique. The credit could be determined by assuming that the purchase 
VAT had been amortized or earned out over a period beginning with the original 
acquisition o f the property. Under this technique the purchase VAT relating to the prior 
exempt or personal use would be denied as a credit and only the remainder o f the 
purchase VAT would be available as a current credit. Amortization, or earning out, could 
be under a straight-line or interest method. (Therefore, in the preceding example, 
$375,000 (25 percent) o f the original purchase VAT ($1.5 million) relates to the prior 
exempt use, based on straight-line amortization, and only $1,125,000 in purchase VAT 
would qualify for a current credit. )148
The earning-out technique is preferable over the fair-market-value technique because o f the 
relative efficiency o f  the former. The fair-market-value technique requires a determination o f 
market value in each conversion and thus will potentially give rise to conflicts between the 
government and taxpayers. The earning-out technique, in contrast, should generally give rise 
to relatively easily determinable numbers. M oreover, the useful life o f each asset that is used 
in amortization o f  the credit and in determining the period over which a partial credit may be 
claimed could be based on the incom e tax class lives. (The earning-out technique is also 
preferable, because it generally works satisfactorily in the “ initial taxable use” and “ mixed use” 
contexts, discussed below). The credit determined upon conversion could be allowed current­
ly or deferred over the remaining useful life o f the property. Simplicity would generally dictate 
a current credit upon conversion, unless there were facts indicating exempt or personal use in 
the future.
Interest should not be payable by the government by reason o f its holding the purchase VAT 
prior to conversion, because the credit is not owing by the government prior to conversion. 
However, if a current credit is not granted in whole or in part upon conversion, interest should 
be paid by the government on the deferred credit.149
Initial Taxable Use
The change o f use could also be from taxable use to exempt or personal use, as, for example, 
in the conversion by a dom estic insurance company o f an office building from taxable rental use 
to exempt use. Failure to recapture a credit upon conversion o f property from taxable use to 
exempt or personal use would discriminate in favor o f  such converted property. It would 
encourage taxpayers to acquire property for an initial taxable use with the plan to convert and 
thereby avoid a noncreditable purchase VAT.
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Assuming that a recapture o f a credit on conversion from taxable use to exempt or personal 
use is desired, several techniques could be used. The following example will illustrate these 
techniques:
The sam e facts apply as in the prior exam ple, except that the initial use was taxable and the use 
after conversion was exem pt. Therefore, a $ 1 .5  m illion credit was allowed based on the initial 
taxable use.150
The amount o f the credit to be recaptured upon conversion could be determ ined under one 
o f the following techniques (which parallel those discussed in the section titled “ Initial Exempt 
or Personal Use” ):150
• Fair-market-value technique. The credit to be recaptured could be based on the lesser o f 
the amount o f  the original purchase VAT ($1.5 million in the previous example) or the 
amount o f  the purchase VAT that would be charged on the current value o f the building 
($1.2 million in the previous example).15
• Earning-out technique. The recapture amount could be the original purchase VAT 
remaining after subtracting an amortized credit relating to taxable use. (Thus, in the 
foregoing example, $375,000 (25 percent o f the original purchase VAT o f $1.5 million) 
relates to the prior taxable use, assuming straight-line amortization, and only $1,125,000 
in purchase VAT would be subject to recapture. )152
The earning-out technique is preferable. (See discussion in the section titled “ Initial 
Exempt or Personal U se.” )
Interest should not be payable by the taxpayer by reason o f the earlier refund o f purchase 
VAT, assuming there was no design to convert the property from taxable use to exempt or 
personal use at the time o f purchase. However, if recapture is deferred in whole or in part upon 
conversion, interest should be paid by the taxpayer on the deferred amount.
Initial Mixed Use
Property could also be acquired initially for mixed use (both taxable and exempt or person­
al), and the mix could shift from year to year. For example, a partially exempt insurance 
company acquires a $100,000 computer, with the estimated use being 20 percent taxable 
(international) and 80 percent exempt (domestic), but the mix will undoubtedly change from 
year to year.
The credit granted for the period o f purchase could be based on estimated initial use. 
However, if anti-avoidance procedures are not established, taxpayers will be encouraged to be 
overly optimistic in their estimated taxable use.
Several techniques should be considered, assuming that an anti-avoidance procedure is 
appropriate for property with an initial mixed use. Each o f these techniques assumes that the 
credit is earned over a specified period, and thus requires amortization o f the credit. The 
following example illustrates these techniques:
An insurance com pany acquired real estate for $10 m illion and paid $ 1 .5  m illion (at 15 percent) 
V A T  on it. Estim ated initial use is 40  percent taxable (for rental) and 60  percent exem pt (for the 
com pany’s own use), which is accurate for the first year. In the second year, how ever, taxable use 
drops to 30  percent, and in the third year taxable use rises to 50  percent. The property has an 
estim ated useful life o f forty years.
The following anti-avoidance techniques should be considered for mixed use property:
1. Earning out— deferred credit. The purchase VAT could be amortized over the proper­
ty’s useful life or some other period, and the amount creditable each year could be based
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on the actual use o f the property each period. Using this approach in the foregoing 
example, assuming straight-line amortization, the purchase VAT credit for the first year 
would be $15,000 (1/4 0  X  40% X  $1,500,000), for the second year would be $11,250(1/40 
X  30% X  $1,500,000), and for the third year would be $18,750 ( 1/40  X  50% X  
$1,500,000).
2. Earning out— initial credit subject to recapture. A second technique would be to grant 
a full credit, subject to recapture over a recapture period based on the actual use in each 
year. Thus, a credit o f $1.5 million would be granted upon purchase o f the property. 
T h e  recapture w ou ld  be $22,500(1/4 0  X  60% X  $1,500,000) in the first year, $26,250(1/4 0  
X  70% X  $1,500,000) in the second year, and $18,750 (1/4 0  X  50% x  $1,500,000) in the 
third year, assuming straight-line amortization.
3. Earning out— estim ated initial use subject to adjustment. Under a third technique, a 
credit could be granted initially based on estimated use, with a recapture or additional 
credit if use changes in subsequent years.153 Using this approach in the foregoing 
example, assuming straight-line amortization, the purchase VAT for the first year would 
be $600,000 (40% x  $1,500,000) and there would be no recapture at the end o f the first 
year. For the second year there would be a recapture o f $3,750 ( ( 1/40 x  .40 X  
$1,500,000) — (1/4 0  X  .30 X  $1,500,000)), and for the third year there would be an 
additional credit o f $3,750 ((1/4 0  X  50% x  $1,500,000) -  (1/40 X  40% X  $1,500,000)). 
Under this third technique, adjustments to the initial (unearned) credit would be 
appropriate for long-life property when the estimated use proves to be significantly 
incorrect (for example, by 10 percent or greater). There would thus be an adjustment 
relating to future years and not the current year. For example, if the future years’ 
adjustments were to be made every five years based on a five-year average and if the 
first five-year average were 30 percent business use (that is, 10 percent less than the 40 
percent estimated business use), there could be a recapture o f part o f the credit granted 
for the remaining thirty-five years (35/40 X  10% X  $1,500,000 =  $131,250, assuming 
straight-line amortization). The current years’ adjustments for the next five years or 
longer would then be based on an estimated 30 percent business use and not 40 percent.
Regardless o f  which o f  the foregoing techniques is chosen, any recapture or additional credit 
(whether for current years or five years) should be accompanied by a payment o f interest.154 
That is, interest should be payable by the government on the granting o f  an additional credit 
(numbers 1 and 3 above) and by the taxpayer upon recapture o f the credit (numbers 2 and 3). 
The payment o f such interest is not only equitable, but it is likely to discourage avoidance 
techniques and excessive claims by the government and by taxpayers.15
Assuming that adequate interest is payable on any recaptured or additional credit, the three 
techniques are seemingly equivalent. However, a business might prefer an initial credit 
subject to recapture if the business assumed that it could earn a greater rate o f  return on 
alternative investments than the interest rate provided. In contrast, the government might 
prefer a deferred credit, largely because its position would not be jeopardized by the fortunes 
o f the business. I f  any purchase credit were granted initially and were subject to recapture, the 
government might insist that its position be secured by a lien on the capital asset involved.
The estimated initial use technique perhaps would be generally satisfactory to both govern­
ment and taxpayers, provided that the government did not receive a lien on the purchased 
capital asset and that the credit for fu ture years (and not just the credit earned each year) could 
be subject to periodic adjustment for long-life assets in appropriate circumstances.
Nevertheless, if the rules for leasing and deferred purchases are not properly drawn, the 
foregoing techniques for mixed use property may discriminate in favor o f leasing, deferred 
purchase o f assets over cash purchase o f  assets, or both.156
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L e a se s  an d  D eferred  P aym en t S a le s ; A cce le ra te d  R em ittance  
an d  D eferred  C re d its
Special rules should be considered for purchases o f property to be leased and for deferred 
payment sales. Econom ic distortions and avoidance opportunities wi ll be created in favor o f 
leasing or deferred payment sales in many situations without these special rules.
Deferred User Credit—Mixed Use Property
W hen a user purchases a mixed use property (property to be used partly for business and 
partly for personal or exempt purposes), the user may have to defer part or all o f the credit for 
purchase VAT.157 In such a case the deferred VAT would becom e available to the user in each 
year o f the earn-out period based on relative business use in each year. Nevertheless, deferral 
o f the credit may be undesirable from the user’s point o f view, particularly if provision is not 
made for payment o f interest on such deferred credit as it is earned.
Either a leasing (taxable) or deferred payment purchase may represent a more attractive 
alternative to the user than a cash purchase o f property. Under a lease, the lessor could 
presumably off er the user terms that would be attractive when compared with the user’s 
alternative o f  cash purchasing the asset and taking a deferred credit with no provision for 
interest on the credit as earned. This is so because the lessor who purchases property for 
taxable lease would ordinarily take a credit for purchase VAT when paid or incurred, and 
would not have to defer the credit. To decrease or remove the econom ic incentive for entering 
into a lease over a cash purchase, the VAT could require the lessor to remit sales VAT on the 
maximum lease rents at the time the lease is entered into.158 Alternatively, the VAT could 
defer the lessor’s purchase VAT credit for mixed use property leases over the property’s useful 
life, an approach that could cause compliance problems for the lessor. A third approach, and 
perhaps the fairest, is for the government to pay interest for its use o f a deferred credit when 
and as allowed, thereby making the cash purchase option more attractive.159
Similar comments can be made about deferred payment purchases by the user. If the seller 
in a deferred payment sale is required to remit sales VAT only as payments are received, the 
user could have the benefit o f a payment deferral that closely matches his deferred credit 
allowance. H owever, the VAT could probably make the deferred payment purchase less 
attractive econom ically, for example, by not permitting the seller’s deferred remittance, 
thereby imposing an additional cost on the seller (presumably to be shifted in whole or in part 
to the buyer). Another alternative would be to decrease the user’s cost by having the 
government pay interest on a deferred credit when and as allowed, as compensation for use o f 
the user’s money.
(The foregoing comments have assumed that the user and the lessor/deferred payment 
seller are unrelated. I f the parties are related, special anti-avoidance rules should treat the 
user and the lessor or seller as one person.)160
Denied User Credit
A federal VAT may deny the user o f an asset a credit for purchase VAT (1) for purchase o f 
certain assets for business use, such as an automobile,16 (2) to the extent the asset is used for 
exempt (or nontaxable) purposes,162 and (3) to the extent the asset is used for personal 
purposes.163
The leasing o f  an asset by the user could be favored over its cash purchase, assuming that the 
lessor o f such assets to the user would be granted a full credit for purchase VAT at the time the 
lessor acquired the asset. Thus, in those situations in which the user would be denied a credit 
for purchase VAT, the lease defers that denial (until rentals are paid), while the lessor gets a 
current credit for purchase VAT paid or incurred.
30
The following alternative approaches are appropriate to discourage leasing from being used 
as a technique for a denied credit deferral when the business user would be denied a credit on 
purchase o f an asset because o f the nature o f the asset, such as an automobile: (1) Deny the 
lessor’s credit upon purchase o f the asset for lease (however, the lessor would charge the user 
sales VAT upon the rentals, which sales VAT would be creditable to the user upon business 
use), or (2) defer the lessor’s credit for purchase VAT. The first approach (credit denial to 
lessor) is used in the United Kingdom164 and is relatively simple in operation in comparison 
with the second approach.
The following approaches are appropriate to discourage leasing from being used as a denied 
credit deferral technique when the credit would be denied in whole or in part because o f the 
exempt or personal use o f the asset by the user and when the lease is long-term165 (1) Require 
the lessor to remit sales VAT at the time o f the lease on the future rentals,166 or (2) defer the 
lessor’s purchase VAT credit for the asset over the term o f the lease.167 The first approach 
would arguably be more effective than the second because the lessor’s purchase VAT (second 
approach) might be significantly smaller than the total sales VAT on the lease (first approach).
The deferred paym ent purchase o f an asset by the user could be favored over its cash 
purchase, assuming that the seller remits sales VAT only upon receipt o f the payments. In such 
a case econom ic decisions would be distorted to favor the deferred payment purchase.
At least one approach is appropriate to prevent deferred payment purchases from being 
used as a denied credit deferral technique: to require that the seller currently remit the full 
sales VAT on the deferred payment sales.168 If such a sweeping rule is unacceptable, it could 
be limited to sales o f credit-denied assets and to significant sales o f other assets.169
(The foregoing comments have assumed that the user and the lessor or deferred payment 
seller are unrelated. I f the parties are related, special anti-avoidance rules should treat the 
user and the lessor or seller as one person. )170
U sed  P roperty: Im puted C red it, M argin  S ch em e, and R evived  C red it
Used property will generally be o f two types: used property inside the VAT “ ring” and used 
property outside. Used property inside the VAT ring has not previously been subjected to a 
denied credit for purchase VAT and generally includes business property. Used property 
outside the VAT ring has previously been subjected to a denied credit for purchase VAT and 
generally includes property used for exempt or personal purposes, as well as business property 
on which a credit for purchase VAT has been denied. Mixed use property could be both inside 
the VAT ring and outside.17 Further, property giving rise to a deferred credit is in a sense 
both inside the VAT ring and outside.
Used property inside the ring gives rise to no unusual problems when it is sold, whether the 
purchaser is to use the property for a business purpose (inside the VAT ring) or an exempt or 
personal purpose (outside the VAT ring). The seller would charge appropriate VAT on the 
sale,172 and the buyer would claim or not claim a purchase VAT credit, depending on the 
buyer’s intended use and the nature o f the property.
Used property outside the VAT ring raises several problems, First o f all, if used property 
outside the VAT ring is brought back into the ring, should it be subject to the special rules that 
recognize that the property previously had borne VAT (hereinafter, the “ out-in situations”)? 
Failure to give such recognition in the out-in situations will discriminate against such 
property, thereby distorting econom ic decisions and encouraging VAT-avoidance schemes. 
This potential discrimination will exist whether used property is acquired by a business for its 
own use or for resale. D ouble taxation could even arise if the property again leaves the VAT 
ring.
Furthermore, if used property outside the VAT ring is sold for an exempt or personal use 
(that is, the property remains outside the VAT ring), should the sale be subject to the VAT
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(hereinafter, the “ out-out situations”)? Subjecting the later sale o f used property to VAT in the 
out-out situations will create significant double-taxation problems. Further, extending the 
VAT to unregistered individuals and organizations will create significant administrative prob­
lems in collecting the tax and even in other areas. Because o f these problems, it is assumed in 
the following discussion that the VAT will not generally apply to sales o f used property in the 
out-out situations. Any VAT coverage would be in unusual cases (for example, large sales o f 
investment-type tangible assets such as stamp and coin collections, historical papers, works o f 
art, and antique and historical objects, as well as real estate). (A good case could be made, 
based on administrative consideration, for limiting VAT coverage o f the out-out situations to 
transactions involving the participation o f attorneys or brokers or involving a paper trail, as is 
the case with real estate.) In place o f partial VAT coverage o f investment-type tangible assets 
in the out-out situations, the incom e tax could be modified to increase the incom e tax on 
dispositions o f these assets in out-out situations,174 thereby perhaps imposing an incom e tax 
equivalent to the VAT.
The principal techniques for avoiding or minimizing discrimination against used property 
are fivefold;
Zero Rating. Zero rating o f used property would avoid double taxation but would also 
eliminate taxation o f  any value added after the prior sale outside the VAT ring (including value 
added by business). Zero rating is not a satisfactory solution because this value added could be 
significant.
Exemption. Exemption o f  sales o f  used property is not ordinarily a satisfactory solution for 
the out-in situations because it requires that business be exempted or partially exem pted and 
thus generally gives rise to the serious attendant problems discussed previously.175
Exemption o f sales o f  used property, however, would ordinarily be a satisfactory solution for 
the out-out situations.176 Nevertheless, exemption would not be a satisfactory solution in the 
case o f investment-type tangible assets because considerable value could be added by collect­
ing and holding the property. Exemption o f investment-type tangible assets assumes that they 
will bear an equivalent tax in another context.
Im puted Credit. A third technique for avoiding or minimizing discrimination against used 
property in out-in  situations would treat part o f the purchase price as being VAT when the 
property is brought back into the VAT ring. The first business purchasing for resale or use (that 
is, the business bringing the property back into the VAT ring) would be granted an imputed 
purchase VAT credit, based on the purchase price. The following formula is used to determine 
the imputed purchase VAT:177
    VAT Rate
Purchase Price X 100% +  VAT Rate
For example, if the VAT rate were 15 percent and the purchase price were $115, then $15 or 
15/115  o f that price would be the imputed purchase VAT. This first business would take the 
imputed credit in the period o f purchase, unless the credit were deferred or denied because o f 
the use to which it puts the property.
Relevant characteristics o f the imputed credit technique in out-in situations are as follows:
• It permits (when appropriate) a credit for purchase VAT for the period o f the purchase 
and thus does not require that the credit on goods held for sale be deferred or that the 
credit be matched with goods sold.
• It provides a credit (when appropriate) for a business that acquires used property for use 
as well as for sale.
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• It is not suitable to apply to the acquisition o f mixed use property partially within the 
VAT ring.
• It needs no special adjustments for inflation or for VAT rate changes because it is based 
on the current purchase price and the current rate.
The imputed credit technique could even be modified for use in out-out situations. In those 
unusual out-out situations to be subject to the VAT, the seller o f covered used property outside 
o f the VAT ring could be granted an imputed credit for purchase VAT at the time o f sale, based 
on the seller’s incom e tax basis, and would charge VAT on his or her sale.
Relevant characteristics o f the imputed credit in out-out situations are as follows:
• It requires no special proof o f payment o f VAT and refers to an amount that is generally 
familiar to individuals, namely, income tax basis.
• It does not subject to the VAT value added before the enactment o f the VAT.
• It needs no special adjustments for VAT rate changes because it would be based on the 
current VAT rate.
• It needs no special adjustments for inherited property or gifted property because incom e 
tax cost takes into account adjustments to cost at the time o f death (fair market value) or o f 
gift (potential increase for part o f gift tax paid).
Margin Scheme. A fourth technique for avoiding or mitigating discrimination against used 
property in out-in  situations would com pute the VAT to be remitted on resale o f the property 
by a business under a “ margin scheme. ” Under this scheme the VAT would be im posed only 
on the difference between the sales price and the purchase price o f each used asset bought and 
sold. In the United Kingdom, which uses the scheme for nine classes o f goods,178 the VAT to 
be remitted is determ ined “ tax inclusive” on this difference. The formula for determining such 
a VAT is as follows:179
(Sale Price — Purchase Price) X  VAT Rate
100% +  VAT Rate
Thus, if the VAT rate is 15 percent, the sales price o f  an asset by a business is $330, and its 
purchase price was $100, then its margin would be $230 ($330 -  $100) and its VAT to be 
remitted would be $30 ($230 X  15/115). I f the second business resold the property for $446 at a 
time when the VAT rate is 16 percent, its margin would be $116 ($446 — $330) and its VAT to 
be remitted would be $16 ($116 X  16/116) .
Relevant characteristics o f the margin scheme in out-in situations are as follows:
• It permits no benefit to business from the VAT implicit in the price o f used property 
purchased for resale until the property is sold, and it requires that the eventual benefit 
be matched with the sale o f the property.
• It gives no benefit to a business that acquires used property for use and not for resale.180
• M oreover, it is not suitable to apply the acquisition o f mixed use property partially 
within the VAT ring because it assumes that the seller previously received no credit for 
his purchase VAT.
• It needs no special adjustments for inflation occurring when the property was used 
outside the VAT ring or for VAT rate changes.
The reason(s) for the U.K. preference for the margin scheme over the imputed credit are not 
entirely clear in view o f the apparent relative advantages o f the imputed credit (concerning the
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first two items above). Apparently, there was concern under the invoice-conscious U.K. 
system that the im puted credit technique would encourage fr aud.18 This is because it grants a 
current im puted credit without an invoice on the purchase o f goods and because it does not 
match this credit with related later sales. An incom e tax system, however, does not need 
special invoice rules to deal with the purchase and sale o f used assets.
The margin schem e could even be adapted for use in the out-out situations. In those unusual 
out-out situations to be subject to the VAT, the seller o f  covered used property outside the 
VAT ring could be required to determine VAT remittance under a margin scheme that refers 
to incom e tax basis as the purchase price under the tax-inclusive formula.
Relevant characteristics o f  the margin scheme in out-out situations are as follows:
• It generally avoids VAT on value added before the enactment o f  a VAT.
• It is not suitable to apply to the acquisition and sale o f mixed use goods.
• It is similar to an incom e tax, since it is based on the difference between the sales price 
and the purchase price.
Because o f  the similarity o f the margin scheme to an income tax, all out-out situations 
(including sales o f investment-type assets) should be subjected to increased tax under the 
regular incom e tax instead o f only investment-type assets being subjected to VAT under the 
margin scheme.182
Revived Credit. A fifth technique for avoiding or mitigating discrimination against used 
property would subject covered used property to VAT on every subsequent resale, even if not 
by a business.183 H owever, a seller would be entitled to claim any previously unallowed credit 
(whether denied or deferred) in determining the amount to be remitted (but not in giving rise 
to a refu nd). As an example, assume that residential real estate is subject to the VAT and that an 
individual previously purchased a residence for his personal use for $100,000, the individual 
paid $10,000 VAT (at 10 percent), and the purchase VAT was denied as a credit. I f the 
residence were later sold by this person for $120,000 at a time when the VAT rate is 15 percent, 
he would collect $18,000 sales VAT but would remit only $8,000 ($18,000 — $10,000). On the 
other hand, if the residence were sold by this person for $60,000 (and not $120,000), he would 
collect $9,000 VAT on the sale but would have to remit nothing and would not be able to get a 
refu nd on the remaining $1,000 o f  the prior denied credit.
Relevant characteristics o f  the revived credit technique are as follows:
• It requires a determination o f prior purchase VAT that had not been granted as a credit.
• It needs special adjustments for inflation and for any VAT rate change (indexing for 
inflation and converting VAT under old rates to VAT under new rates).
• It will tax pre-VAT enactment value added.
• It permits a credit to a business for purchase VAT for the period o f the purchase.
• It provides a credit for a business that acquires used property for use (as well as for sale).
The revived credit is generally well suited for mixed use property,184 because it permits the 
business to recover any denied or deferred credits (except to the extent amortized). However, 
it is not suggested for other out-in business situations because it needs special adjustments for 
inflation185 and for VAT rate changes and because it taxes pre-VAT enactment value added.
The revived credit is also not suitable for either out-in or out-out situations involving 
unregistered persons. First, unregistered persons are likely to encounter difficulty in making 
necessary proof (for example, proof o f the amount o f  denied purchase VAT and proof that the 
seller to the unregistered person remitted the purchase VAT when the unregistered person
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bought the property). Second, when unregistered persons are subject to the VAT only on 
larger sales (as probably is necessary), an inequitable situation will potentially be created when 
the unregistered person’s purchase price did not exceed the threshold amount but his sales 
price does. In such a case the unregistered person would have to charge sales VAT but would 
have no purchase VAT for a credit (even though the used property might have borne VAT 
when placed in service as new ).186
Conclusions
For the reasons stated previously, it is recom m ended that the following kinds o f used 
property situations be covered with the following techniques:187
• Out-in situations involving mixed use property— revived credit
• Other out-in situations— imputed credit
• Out-out situations involving covered investment-type tangible property— imputed 
credit
• Other out-out situations— exemption
U n u se d  V A T  C re d its  U n d er the  Federal Incom e Tax
The denial, recapture, or deferral o f the VAT credit for purchase VAT (“ unused VAT 
credits” )188 will present problem s under the federal incom e tax. Should unused VAT credits 
give rise to federal incom e tax benefits, either as expenses or capitalized costs? I f so, subse­
quent VAT allowance o f  unused VAT credits will give rise to potential taxable incom e under 
the tax benefit rule. That is, there would be incom e under the federal incom e tax, but only to 
the extent that the prior unused VAT credit had previously been deducted and the deduction 
offset income.
An approach to the federal incom e tax problem  that is generally equitable, consistent with 
the federal incom e tax rules, and not unduly complicated is described below. This approach 
assumes that the VAT credit will be denied, recaptured, deferred, or granted unaffected by 
the federal incom e tax results.
Denied or Recaptured VAT Credits
Purchase VAT that is denied as a credit and a prior credit that is recaptured would be 
deducted, capitalized, or disallowed as deductible or capitalizable costs under the usual 
federal incom e tax principles.189 The denial or recapture o f the VAT credit, however, will 
generally be related to a tangible fixed asset and thus will generally be capitalized, subject to 
possible depreciation. I f the previously denied or recaptured VAT credit is subsequently 
allowed or revived as a VAT credit,190 it would potentially give rise to taxable incom e under the 
tax benefit rule o f  the federal incom e tax.
Deferred Credits
Deferred credits should not be allowed presently as a federal incom e tax deduction or a 
capitalized cost because they will potentially be allowed by the VAT.19 If and when such a 
deferred credit is allowed by the VAT, it will not give rise to incom e taxation under the tax 
benefit rule o f  the federal incom e tax. On the other hand, if a deferred credit is denied by the 
VAT, it should be treated as a denied credit at that time and deducted, capitalized, or 
disallowed as a deduction or capitalized cost, as appropriate under the federal incom e tax.192
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Used Property and the Tax Benefit Rule
The following techniques suggested for avoiding VAT discrimination against used property 
(discussed in the previous section) need not avoid the tax benefit rule:
• The revived credit suggested for out-in used property situations involving mixed use 
property represents the VAT allowance o f a previously unused VAT credit and thus 
should be treated as such under the federal incom e tax.
• The imputed credit suggested for other out-in situations does not represent VAT 
allowance o f an unused credit to the person to whom it is granted (the first business 
buyer). Further, although the seller was previously granted a basis increase in the sold 
property for the denied credit, presumably this basis increase will be offset by a higher 
price the buyer is willing to pay (because the buyer gets an imputed credit).
• The imputed credit suggested for out-out used property situations involving certain 
investment-type tangible property is granted to the seller who previously capitalized a 
denied credit, and it should therefore be treated either as a reduction o f his incom e tax 
basis or an amount realized on his sale.
• Exemption suggested for other out-out situations is not equivalent to granting the buyer 
or seller a credit and thus requires no special income tax treatment.
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Chapter 5
FAIRNESS
A VAT should be structured so that it not only operates fairly but is also perceived as 
operating fairly by ordinary citizens and by managers and owners o f b u s in e s s e s .193 As 
accountants, we are especially concerned that the VAT is perceived as fair because we 
recognize that perceptions o f unfairness will erode support for a VAT and will encourage 
avoidance and evasion schemes. In furtherance o f fairness in operation and in perception, the 
following matters are among those that should be considered.194
V ertica l E q u ity
A broad-based, credit m ethod VAT is regressive in the sense that as spending power, 
income, or wealth decreases among families and classes, the relative burden o f the tax 
increases to the extent that the VAT burden is shifted forward to consumers. This regressivity 
is a subject o f  concern to both proponents and opponents o f the VAT. Alternative solutions to 
the regressivity problem  include the following:195
• N oncoverage o f  necessities. Necessities such as housing, food (but not restaurant food), 
utilities, bus and rail intracity transportation, and medical care would be zero rated or 
low rated.
• Increased transfer payments. Governm ent-provided transfer payments would be in­
creased to the extent that they are not automatically adjusted to compensate for the 
cost-of-living increase caused by the VAT.
• Reim bursem ent fo r  the VAT. The increased burden on the poor from the VAT would be 
reduced by reimbursing those at lower incom e levels, either through an incom e tax 
credit or through a refund independent o f the incom e tax.
In the public’s view, o f  these suggested solutions the zero rating o f necessities and the 
reimbursement o f  the VAT are the most likely to be connected with the VAT and thus im prove 
the VAT’s image. Zero rating o f necessities is likely to create the most favorable impression o f 
the VAT, although it probably is the costliest solution from the government’s viewpoint. The 
solution favored by the U.K. VAT is to zero rate certain necessities.196
O w n e r-O ccu p ie d  H o u s in g
A broad-based credit m ethod VAT could be resented by the middle class because o f  its 
impact on ow ner-occupied housing. Assuming that the VAT rate is relatively high (a realistic 
assumption in view  o f the history o f the VAT in Europe)197 and that necessities are standard 
rated, a broad-based VAT shifted forward to the consumer will add a significant cost to
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housing. In particular, middle-class ownership o f housing is likely to suffer. As a consequence, 
a broad-based VAT is likely to be an unpopular tax with the middle class. It thus seems 
especially desirable that housing be zero rated or low  rated under the VAT if necessities are not 
zero or low  rated.
L o s e rs  an d  W in n e rs
The credit m ethod VAT is designed to be collected by the seller from the buyer and remitted 
by the seller (net o f purchase VAT). Two potential inequities arise out o f this characteristic.
If the seller fails to collect this tax or collects tax at too low a rate through mistake o f  fact or 
law, whether culpable or innocent, the seller nevertheless must make the proper remittance 
and may have no practical recourse against custom ers.198 A long delay in correcting an 
erroneous practice could be extremely difficult financially on a business. Fairness toward 
business and desirable perceptions o f fairness by owners and managers o f business can only be 
prom oted through clear rules and “bright lines,” effective dissemination o f these rules among 
business, a properly staffed revenue agency, and prompt resolution o f disputes and policy 
questions. Failure to take such steps will make the VAT unpopular with managers and owners 
o f business.
On the other hand, if the seller by mistake collects excessive VAT from customers and gets a 
refund for excess VAT remitted, the seller who pockets the refund and does not pass it on to 
consumers apparently gets a windfall.19 In this connection, it might not be practical or 
possible to locate buyers and make a refund.20 Further, it is impractical to determine to what 
extent the seller bore the VAT and to what extent the buyers, the suppliers o f the seller, or 
both bore the VAT. As a consequence, refunds should be made to sellers whether or not as a 
practical matter customers and suppliers will get any benefit from the refund. However, any 
problem will be minimized by taking the steps suggested previously for insuff i cient tax.
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A ppendix A
Value-Added Tax Rates in January 1989 (Europe)
Luxury 
Country S tandard (% ) Low er (% ) (or Higher)
Austria 20 10 32
Belgium 19 6 & 17* 25†
Denm ark 22 * —
France 18.6 5.5* 2 5 t
West G erm any 14 7
G reece 16 6* 36
Ireland 25 0* —
Italy 19 4 & 9 * 38
Luxem bourg 12 3 & 6 —
Netherlands 18.5 6 —
Norway 20 —
Portugal 16 0 & 8 30
Spain 12 6 33
Sweden 23.46 — * —
Turkey 10 0* 15
United K ingdom 15 0 —
Notes:
*A dditional low er or ze ro  rates ap p lie d  to a  lim ited group, or lim ited groups, of com m odities. 
† A dditional tax  on so m e com m odities .
U n d er gu ide lines  a d o p te d  by the Council of EEC  fin an ce m inisters on D e c e m b e r 18, 1989 , all 
national V A T rates h a ve  to b e  set within tw o rates: the stand ard  rate an d  the red u ced  rate. Further, the  
standard  rate is to b e  no low er than 14 pe rc en t an d  no h igher than 2 0  percent.
Form at: P rice W ate rh ouse , A B rie f G u id e  to V A T in the E uro p ean  Community. (N e w  York: Price  
W aterhouse, 1 9 8 6 ), 23 , 24 , 33 , 92 .
Source: For u p d a te d  ra te s , H e r M a jes ty ’s C ustom s and  Excise.
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A ppendix B
General Consum ption Taxes and Value-Added Tax* 
as a Percentage of Total Taxation
1965 1975 1985
Country
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
West G erm any
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxem bourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United K ingdom  
United States
Consumption VAT Consumption VAT Consumption VAT
7.3 
18.7 
21.1 
18.2
9.1
18.9
23.3
16.5 
11.0
5.7
12.9 
0
12.4
12.4
7.7
21.6 
0
22.2
10.4
9.4 
0
5.9
4.6
0
0
0
0
0
0
20.1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6.6
19.8
15.9 
12.5
16.9
17.8
23.3
14.7
18.9
14.7
14.3 
0
12.0
14.4 
9.0
20.5 
11.2 
15.3 
12.0
7.7 
0
8.8 
6.7
0
19.8
15.9 
0
16.9 
0
23.0
14.7 
0
14.7
14.3 
0
12.0
14.4 
0
20.5 
0 
0
12.0
0
0
8.8
0
7.9
21.0
15.7
13.2 
20.0
21.2
19.9
15.8
17.2 
20.6
14.5 
0
12.8
16.3
10.4 
18.2
12.6 
14.1
13.9
9.3
28.5
15.9
7.4
0
21.0
15.7 
0
20.0
0
19.6
15.8 
0
20.6 
14.5
0
12.8
16.3 
0
18.2
0
0
13.9 
0
27.3
15.9 
0
N ote:
*The V A T is a  form  of gen era l consum ption tax and, therefore, inc luded in the genera l consum ption tax figure. In 
som e instances, it is the only co nsu m p tio n-type tax.
Source: O rg an iza tion  for E conom ic C o-opera tion  and  D eve lop m ent, R eve n u e Statistics o f O E C D  M e m b e r  Countries; 
1 9 6 5 -1 9 8 6 .
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A ppendix C
General Consum ption Taxes and Value-Added Tax* 
as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product
Country
1965 1975 1985
Consumption VAT Consumption VAT Consumption VAT
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
West Germ any
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxem bourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United K ingdom  
United States
1.7
6.5
6.5
4.6
2.7
5.6 
8.1
5.2
2.3 
1.5
3.0 
0
3.8
4.1
1.9
7.2 
0
3.3
3.7 
2.0
0
1.8 
1.2
0 1.8 0 2.4 0
0 7.7 7.7 8.9 8.9
0 6.5 6.5 7.4 7.4
0 4.0 0 4.4 0
0 7.0 7.0 9.9 9.9
0 6.3 0 7.9 0
7.0 8.7 8.6 9.1 9.0
0 5.3 5.3 6.0 6.0
0 4.7 0 6.0 0
0 4.6 4.6 8.1 8.1
0 3.6 3.6 5.0 5.0
0 0 0 0 0
0 4.7 4.7 5.5 5.5
0 6.3 6.3 7.3 7.3
0 2.8 0 3.6 0
0 9.2 9.2 8.7 8.7
0 2.8 0 3.9 0
0 3.0 0 4.1 0
0 5.3 5.3 7.0 7.0
0 2.3 0 3.0 0
0 0 0 4.6 4.4
0 3.1 3.1 6.0 6.0
0 1.9 0 2.2 0
N ote:
*The  V A T is a  form  of gen era l consum ption tax  an d , therefore, inc luded  in the genera l consum ption tax  figure. In 
som e instances, it is the only co nsu m p tio n-type tax.
Source: O rgan iza tion  for E conom ic C o-opera tion  an d  D eve lop m ent, R even u e Statistics o f O E C D  M e m b e r  Countries; 
1 9 6 5 -1 9 8 6 .
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N otes
1. See A IC P A  Statem ent o f Tax Policy N o. 2 ., V alue-A dded Tax (1975), 2 ; A IC P A  Tax D ivision, 
Alternatives to the Present Tax System for Increasing Saving and Investment (W ashington: 
A IC P A , 1985), 30 . H ow ever, the A IC P A  Tax D ivision is presently review ing its position on 
consum ption taxes, including the credit m ethod V A T . The Am erican Bar Association and its 
Section o f Taxation have form ally recom m ended that a credit m ethod V A T  be em ployed over 
other m ethods.
2. Professor Bravenec studied the U .K . V A T  during the period January through M ay 1988, 
interview ing approxim ately fifty V A T  specialists fr om  accounting firm s, law firm s, industry, and 
governm ent (H er M ajesty ’s C ustom s and Excise) (hereinafter “ U .K . persons surveyed”). 
Observations on the operation o f the U .K . V A T  are based on these interviews. W h en  a statem ent 
is m ade about the view s o f U .K . persons surveyed, it will usually give both the percentage o f  
persons expressing an opinion (but not including those not expressing an opinion) and the 
percentage o f all persons surveyed (including those not expressing an opinion) (for exam ple, 
“ U .K . persons surveyed (62 percent, 41 percent— note 2) agree th at. . . ”). I f  a statem ent is based  
on conversations with U . K . persons surveyed (but not a formal survey), it is expressed as “ many  
U .K . persons su rveyed .”
References are m ade to various U .K . sources, which are abbreviated as follows:
C & E — H er M ajesty’s C ustom s and Excise 
Com m issioners— Com m issioners o f C & E  
E E C — European E conom ic Com m unity  
F A — Finance A ct 
R eg.— Regulation
Sch.— Schedule (e .g ., 4  Sch. =  Fourth Schedule)
SI— Statutory Instrum ent
V A T A  198a—Value A dded  Tax A ct o f 1983
C om plete U .K . statutory and administrative materials, as w ell as the E E C  Council directives, 
m ay b e found in J .F . A very Jones, Encyclopedia o f the Value Added Tax (London: Sw eet &  
M axw ell, 1989). L im ited reference will also be m ade to the N ew  Zealand G oods and Services Tax 
A ct 1985 , as am ended (hereinafter “ N ew  Zealand G STA ”).
3. N ovem ber 1984 (hereinafter the “ 1984 Treasury Report” ). Further, this study neither duplicates 
nor evaluates the m ajor design work “Value Added Tax; A  M odel Statute and C om m entary, A  
Report o f the C om m ittee on Value A dded Tax o f the Am erican Bar Association Section o f  
Taxation” (1989) (hereinafter the “A B A  Tax Section V A T  C om m ittee Report”).
4. M any U .K . persons surveyed (note 2) do not consider their V A T  to be a neutral tax, and they do 
consider their V A T  presently to rival their incom e tax in com plexity. The consciousness o f these 
U . K . persons surveyed that their V A T  was not a neutral or sim ple tax was perhaps raised over the 
past decade w ith the 1979 increase in the U .K . standard V A T  rate from  8 percent to 15 percent 
and with the governm ent’s eff orts to m inim ize avoidance o f the tax. (The 1979 increase was 
accom panied by  a m ove from  a m ultiple-rate structure to a single-rate structure (not including  
the zero rate).) In this connection, Anthony Barber, the U .K . Chancellor o f the Exchequer  
during the adoption o f the U .K . V A T  stated the objective o f pre-adoption consultations as follows:
This process o f consultation has been invaluable in planning the details o f the tax w ith the 
object o f ensuring that from  the point o f view  o f industry and com m erce it will be at least as 
sim ple to operate as in any o f the eight European countries which now  have a V .A .T ., and 
m uch sim pler than in m ost o f those countries. [833 H .C . D eb . 1368 (M arch 21 , 1972).]
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The discussions w hich the Custom s and Excise w ill have will be based on published  
inform ation .. . .  I f  w e are to have the sim plest V A T  in E urope, which I am determ ined w e  
shall have, it is essential that the Custom s and Excise, in its discussions with trade and 
industry, shall not b e  ham strung in any way. [834 H .C . D eb . 207  (M arch 28 , 1972).]
5. See, for exam ple, K en Sanden, “V A T : W h at, H ow , W h e r e ,” Tax Adviser (M arch 1973): 1 5 1 -5 2 ; 
John N olan, “Advantages o f Value A dded or O ther Consum ption Tax at the Federal L e v e l,” 
National Tax Journal (1972): 433 ; Charles M cL ure, “ E conom ic Effects o f Taxing Value A d d e d ,”  
in Broad-Based Taxes: New Options and Sources, ed. M usgrave (1973), 173; D an T . Sm ith, 
James W eb b er, and Carol C erf, W hat You Should Know About the Value Added Tax (1973), 
80 - 8 6 ; D an T . Sm ith, “V alue-A dded  Tax: The Case for,” Harvard Business Review  (N ov .—D ec. 
1970): 7 9 -8 0 . Care m ust be taken to m eet proponents o f the V A T  on exactly those neutrality  
characteristics attributed to the V A T  and those lack-of-neutrality characteristics attributed to the 
incom e tax. It should be noted that the introduction o f the V A T  could change the relative tax 
burden o f (1) an industry, (2) the products o f an industry, (3) a com pany within an industry, or (4) 
consum ers and savers. Further, the V A T  will probably have a different incidence from  that o f  
existing taxes. See Sm ith, W eb b er, and Cerf, W hat You Should Know About the Value Added  
Tax, 9 7 -1 3 7 .
6. The frilly taxable person in U .K . term inology is referred to as the “ tax collector,” w hile the 
ultim ate consum er is referred to as the “ taxpayer.” The U .K . term inology will not b e used  
herein.
7. This form  o f V A T  is referred to as the credit m ethod because o f the credit allowed for V A T  paid on 
purchases. It can also b e  referred to as the indirect subtractive approach.
A n alternative subtractive approach first com putes value added and then applies the tax rate: 
V A T  Liability =  Rate X  (Taxable Sales Less Taxed Purchases). This m ethod could be called an 
accounts m ethod, since it relies on net sales and net purchases taken from taxpayers’ books o f  
account. It can also b e  referred to as the direct subtractive approach. The accounts m ethod  
theoretically gives the sam e result, apart from tim ing differences, as an additive m ethod that 
m easures value added as the sum o f profits and other paym ents to the factors o f production not 
otherw ise taxed, such as depreciation, wages, interest, and rents. This factors-of-production  
m ethod is rarely used. See text accom panying at notes 74—79 below .
8. Sales V A T  is generally not included in the tax base. H ow ever, V A T  could be included in the tax 
base o f retail sales. Value Added Tax: A  Report by the National Economic Development Office 
(London: H er M ajesty’s Stationery O ffice, 1971), (hereinafter “ N E D O  Report’’). The form ula for 
determ ining the V A T  collected on a tax-inclusive basis is as follows:
V A T  C ollected  =  ------  —  x  Sales Price
100%  +  V A T  Rate
Thus, if  the sales price w ere $110 and the V A T  rate w ere 10 percent, the V A T  deem ed collected  
w ould b e $10 ((10% /110% ) X  $110). The foregoing form ula is referred to in the U nited Kingdom  
as the “V A T  fraction.” D eterm ination o f the V A T  under a VAT-inclusive approach (that is, under 
the V A T  formula) w ill be appropriate in the margin schem e (see text accom panying note 179), the 
im puted credit (see text accom panying note 177), and certain retail sales. See C & E  N otice 700  
(O ct. 1987), paragraph 29  (pay phones); C & E  N otice 727 (Oct. 1988) (retail schem es).
9. A n im m ediate full credit for purchases o f capital goods is not preordained. See notes 8 9 -9 8  below  
and accom panying text.
10. W ith  identical rates o f taxation, assum ing no substantial reduction o f the base for tax, the credit 
m ethod V A T  will yield revenues com parable to those collected from a retail sales tax levied  on  
both goods and services and levied only at the final stage o f the distribution process.
11. The V A T  described up to this point is known as a consum ption form o f the V A T . A n incom e form  
o f the V A T  w ould grant a credit for inventory and capital goods based on their utilization.
12. There m ay b e a rate threshold to b e  crossed before businesses and their tax advisers enter into a 
new  dim ension o f tax planning and com pliance and revenue officials similarly enter into a new  
dim ension o f prevention o f tax avoidance. This threshold was apparently crossed in the U nited  
K ingdom  in 1979, according to m any U .K . persons surveyed, w hen the standard rate was
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increased from  8 percent to 15 percent. From  April 1, 1973, the date o f introduction o f the V A T , 
to the present, the U .K . rates have been—
Standard H igher
Rate Rate
Apr. 1, 1973-Ju ly  28, 1974 10% —
July 29, 1974-N ov. 17, 1974 8 —
Nov. 18, 1974-A pr. 11, 1976 8 25%
Apr. 12, 1976-June  17, 1979 8 12.5
June 18, 1979-Present 15 —
(The higher rate for N ovem ber 18, 1974 to April 1 1 ,  1976 was originally lim ited to petrol products 
but was expanded on M ay 1, 1975 .) F A  1972 sec. 9(1); SI 1974 /1224 ; F A  1975 secs. 1, 2 ; F A  (N o. 2) 
1975 sec. 17; F A  1976 sec. 17; F A  (N o. 2) 1979 sec. 1. For the fiscal year ending M arch 31 , 1989, 
the U .K . central governm ent’s revenues from its V A T  and car tax constituted 2 3 .6  percent o f its 
total revenues. For the sam e fiscal year, revenues from  V A T , custom s, and excise constituted  
4 0 .9  percent o f total revenues. H er M ajesty’s Custom s and Excise, Report fo r  the Year Ended 31 
March 1989  (1989), (hereinafter “ H .M . Custom s and Excise 1989 Report” ). The percentage o f  
total tax revenue in the U nited Kingdom  represented by its V A T  has increased steadily follow ing  
its introduction. See Organization for E conom ic Co-operation and D evelopm ent, Revenue 
Statistics o f  O E C D  M em ber Countries, 1985-1986  (Paris: O E C D ), 149.
V A T  rates throughout E urope are generally high by U .S . consum ption tax standards, the 
standard rate ranging fr om  12 percent (Spain) to 25  percent (Ireland). The average standard rate 
for E urope (not including Turkey) is 18 .18  percent. See appendix A  above (p. 39).
The V A T  raises substantial revenue for the European countries w here it is em ployed, raising in
1985 from about 13 percent o f total tax collections (Luxem bourg) to about 21 percent o f total tax 
collections (Austria and Ireland), in contrast to the 7 .4  percent for general consum ption taxes in 
the U nited States. As a percentage o f gross dom estic product in the European countries, it 
ranged in 1985 fr om  5 percent (Italy) to 9 .9  percent (Denm ark), in contrast to the 2 .2  percent for 
general consum ption taxes in the U nited States. See appendixes B and C  above (pp. 41 , 43).
13. The likely incidence o f the V A T  has been treated extensively in the literature and need not be  
considered here. For an excellent discussion o f V A T  incidence, see Clara Sullivan, The Tax on 
Value Added  (N ew  York: Colum bia University Press 1965), 2 6 3 -8 3 .
14. As an alternative to a reduced rate, the tax base could be reduced, for exam ple, by 40  percent. 
N E D O  Report, 33 . Such a reduction was adopted in the U nited Kingdom  as part o f a transition 
from  exem ption to standard rating o f rental nondom estic real estate. 1989 Finance Bill, 4  Sch. 
paragraph 4(5). The tax base is reduced by one-half for one year under existing com m ercial leases, 
but there is a phased-out four-year relief for charities. See also, H er M ajesty’s C ustom s and 
E xcise, N ew s Release N o. 4 7 /8 8 , “ Consultation Paper: V A T  on N on-D om estic Construction” 
(June 21 , 1988), Introductory Statem ent (d), in J .F . A very Jones, Encyclopedia o f  the Value 
Added Tax, 5 -884 .
15. Price W aterhouse, A  B rief Guide to VAT in the European Community (Price W aterhouse, 1986),
23 , 24 , 33 , 92.
16. The U nited K ingdom  makes extensive use o f zero rating (note 20  below ), whereas D enm ark’s use 
o f zero rating is m inim al.
17. W h en  there are m ultiple rates (including a zero rate), retailers may find it diff icult to determ ine  
the tax liability because o f uncertainty concerning the am ount o f sales at each rate. Retailers m ay  
thus require special schem es to determ ine sales under each rate. In the U nited K ingdom , for 
exam ple, there are tw elve possible retail schem es, one or m ore o f which may be available to each  
retailer depending on the retailer’s situation. The U .K . retail schem es generally perm it the 
retailer to determ ine tim ing o f sales under the cash m ethod, w hile not taking away the retailer’s 
ability to determ ine tim ing o f purchases under the accrual m ethod. As a result, the U .K . retailer 
can generally have the best o f the cash and accrual m ethods. C & E  N otice N o. 727 (O ct. 1988).
18. For a discussion o f the cash flow  advantages and disadvantages o f subjecting interm ediate stages 
to the V A T , see the section titled “ Cash Flow  E ffects o f the V A T ” (pp. 5 -7 ) .
19. I f  the retail level in an activity is characterized by avoidance o f either the incom e tax or the V A T , 
som e o f the avoided tax could be recovered through the V A T  at the interm ediate level. For
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exam ple, if hom e im provem ents w ere low  rated under the V A T  but w ere characterized by  
incom e tax avoidance by contractors taking cash, the sales o f easily identifiable building materials 
could be standard rated. The contractor w ould either report the supply on his V A T  return to 
claim the credit, thereby making him  or her vulnerable to incom e tax audit, or w ould forgo filing a 
V A T  return, thereby decreasing the am ount o f avoided tax. (This approach m ight be difficult to 
explain to hom eow ners who make their own im provem ents.)
20. The U nited K ingdom  zero rates fifteen activities or groups, the principal being food, sew erage 
services and water for nonbusiness custom ers, books, fuel and pow er for residential or charitable 
use, exports, and construction o f buildings for residential or charitable purposes. V A T A  1983  
secs. 16(2)-(5 ), 48(6), 48(7) and 5 Sch .; F A  1984 sec. 13. (See note 146 below .) In contrast, N ew  
Zealand makes m inim al use o f zero rating, principally for exports. N ew  Zealand G S T A  sec. 11.
21. H ow ever, a zero rate could be im posed on an interm ediate level if  sellers at that level m ight have 
trouble in rem itting V A T  payable to the governm ent. For exam ple, if the governm ent experi­
ences difficulty in collecting V A T  from  building subcontractors but not contractors, supplies by  
subcontractors could be zero rated. The revenue loss from zero rating w ould be recovered at the 
next level, assum ing that collection problem s are not presented at this level.
22. Zero rating o f sales to governm ental units and to certain charities, together with exem ption o f 
these entities, was considered but not recom m ended as a m ethod for their noncoverage in the 
1984 Treasury Report, 6 9 -7 2 . The U nited Kingdom  zero rates certain provisions o f goods and 
services to charities or for charitable purposes. V A T A  1983, 5  Sch. groups 1, 4 , 7 , 8 , 10, 14, 16. 
The U nited K ingdom  also zero rates certain provisions o f goods and services for residential use. 
V A T A  1983 , 5  Sch. groups 7, 8 . In addition, it zero rates the provision o f sew erage services and 
water for nonbusiness custom ers. V A T A  1983, 5 Sch. group 2.
23. A  similar problem  is presented by consum er discounts and by rebates (for exam ple, rebates by  
supply cooperatives).
I f  a custom er m ust loan funds to a supplier at low  interest or no interest, interest will arguably 
have to b e im puted and V A T  paid on a m atching additional consideration in order to reflect 
properly the actual price paid by the custom er for goods and services. See the U .K . case o f Exeter  
G o lf Country C lub Ltd. v. C & E  C om m issioners, 1981 Sim on’s Tax Cas. 211 (C . A .) ; c f  IR C  sec. 
7872. Failure to make such an im putation will encourage taxpayer avoidance.
24. V A T  w ould be avoided. A lthough the cost o f these item s may be reflected in the sales prices o f a 
business and therefore in V A T  collected, so w ould cash com pensation to em ployees and cash gifts 
to custom ers. The problem  is that a good or service w ould be furnished to an em ployee or a 
custom er V A T -free if V A T  is not charged by the business upon its furnishing the good or service 
and if the business is perm itted purchase V A T  credit with respect thereto.
25. U nder the U .K . approach the nonbusiness use o f goods is subject to tax. V A T A  1983, 2  Sch. 
paragraph 5(3). O therw ise, the gift o f a service is not subject to tax. Further, under the U .K . 
approach, free m eals to em ployees, goods costing less than £10 given for business purposes and 
not form ing part o f a series o f gifts to the same person, and gifts to actual or potential custom ers o f 
industrial sam ples not ordinarily available for sale to the public are not subject to V A T . O ther­
w ise, a gift o f a business asset is subject to V A T . V A T A  1983, 2 Sch. paragraph 5(2), 4  Sch. 
paragraph 10. I f  business gifts furnished to registered persons are subject to the V A T , either the 
recipient or the grantor should b e able to claim credit for such V A T . In the U nited K ingdom  the 
provider is perm itted to issue a tax certificate to the registered recipient. C & E  Press N otice N o. 
889 , (M arch 1, 1984); F 323 , Paul W . D eV oil, Value-Added Tax (1989). An alternative to taxing 
em ployee fringe benefits and em ployee gifts w ould be to deny credit for the em ployer s purchase 
V A T  relating thereto. Such an approach w ould be difficult to adm inister. The Treasury Report (at 
pages 82  and 83) recom m ends such denial only in the case o f purchases for gifts to em ployees and 
also recom m ends consideration o f such denial in the cases o f m eals, drinks, and autom obiles 
furnished to em ployees. The A B A  Tax Section V A T  C om m ittee Report (at pages 46  and 164—165) 
does not tax business gifts. Further, this report (at pages 38 and 39) taxes em ployee fringe 
benefits only to the extent included in gross incom e under the federal incom e tax.
26. Such advertising is currently deductible for federal incom e tax purposes.
27. Such em ployee fringe benefits w ould generally include those giving rise to em ployer deductions 
and em ployee exclusions.
28. See note 17 above for a description o f the U .K . retail schem es.
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29. U nder the U .K . V A T , the taxable event is generally the earlier o f the rendering o f the invoice, 
the paym ent for the goods or services, or the delivery o f goods or services. V A T A  1983 secs. 4 , 5. 
The U nited K ingdom  perm its small businesses to elect the cash m ethod. V A T A  1983, 7  Sch. 
2(3A); F A  1987 sec. 11(2); C & E  N otice N o. 731 (Oct. 1987). N ew  Zealand law is similar to the 
U nited K ingdom ’s. N ew  Zealand G S T A  sec. 19.
30. U .K . persons surveyed (note 2) agreed that a business will prefer the cash m ethod over the 
invoice m ethod if it typically has credit sales and cash purchases (77 percent, 50 percent) but not if  
it typically has cash sales and credit purchases (73 percent, 48  percent).
31. See note 30  above.
32. U .K . persons surveyed (95 percent, 89  percent— note 2) agreed that an invoice m ethod business 
purchaser is significantly encouraged to take delivery o f its high-cost purchase item s shortly  
before the end o f a period instead o f the beginning o f the next period, assum ing similar purchase 
term s.
33. V A T A  1983 sec. 22 ; F A  1985 sec. 32 ; SI 1986 /337 . Form al bankruptcy m ight not be sought if a 
purchaser m oves and becom es untraceable.
The noted problem  for bad debts may be avoided in the U nited Kingdom  if the business is a 
small business that uses the cash m ethod. SI 1987 /1427 ; C & E  N otice N o. 731 (O ct. 1987). 
Further, the problem  m ay b e avoided if the supplier uses one o f several special retail schem es 
involving the “ standard m ethod o f gross takings.” V A T A  1983, 7 Sch. paragraph 2(3A ); F A  1987  
sec. 11(2); C & E  N otice N o. 727  (O ct. 1988). The U .K . persons surveyed (98 percent, 87  
percent— note 2) agreed that a business will prefer the cash m ethod over the invoice m ethod if it 
is likely to have significant bad debts. They also agreed that separate incorporation o f a separate 
business o f a com pany (with no group registration) would have a significant V A T  advantage if the 
business w ill probably have high uncollectible debts fr om  fu ture sales and will b e  able to use the 
cash m ethod (100 percent, 72 percent) and that separate registration o f divisions o f a com pany  
w ould have a significant V A T  advantage if one o f the divisions may thereby be able to use the cash 
m ethod (85 percent, 50  percent).
34. The U nited K ingdom  does not make available an installm ent m ethod for rem ittance o f V A T  on  
deferred paym ent sales. V A T A  1983, 2  Sch. 1(2); V A T A  1983 secs. 4 , 5(1).
35. Rules m ay have to b e  enacted that defer the purchaser’s credit in the case o f related parties. C f. 
IR C  sec. 267(a)(2).
36. Cash flow  and other advantages o f vertical integration do not seem  important if a current 
purchase V A T  credit is available and is taken at the same tim e as the seller’s rem ittance o f sales 
V A T . H ow ever, vertical integration could be advantageous if the purchaser is partially exem pt, if 
there is a denial or deferral o f the purchase V A T  credit, if the seller uses the accrual m ethod and 
the buyer the cash m ethod, or if the seller has m inim al taxed purchases (as with an integrated oil 
com pany).
37. Although the taxation o f transactions betw een divisions o f a corporation and betw een related  
corporations w ould reduce the incentive to self-supply, this step represents form idable problem s 
and had not been  taken by the Europeans except in isolated cases. The Europeans have not dealt 
with the problem  o f vertical integration, in part perhaps because the European business 
integration has been  prim arily horizontal and because the V A T  replaced turnover taxes that 
provided a m uch stronger incentive to integrate vertically.
The U .K . persons surveyed (81 percent, 57  percent— note 2) agreed that the advantage o f a 
vertically integrated business over a com peting nonvertically integrated business can be signifi­
cant in certain instances. M oreover, the U .K . persons surveyed (61 percent, 37  percent) agreed  
that this advantage significantly encourages vertical integration in appropriate cases.
38. The U . K . persons surveyed (note 2) agreed on several situations in which a group registration for 
two com panies is not likely to be sought: (1) if one o f the com panies has been using the cash 
m ethod and the group w ill have to use the accrual m ethod (86 percent, 41 percent); (2) w hen one  
o f the com panies engages in an exem pt activity and the group will have to use the U .K . partial 
exem ption rules (73 percent, 52  percent); and (3) when one or m ore o f the com panies supplies 
retail services and w ould otherw ise not have to register (72 percent, 46  percent).
G roup registration is advantageous in saving a considerable am ount o f paper work (invoicing 
and accounting for VA T) betw een m em bers o f a group. G roup registration could also be
49
advantageous in achieving (as a group) the m inim um  am ount o f sales necessary for registration  
w hen voluntary registration is not perm itted.
39. V A T A  1983 sec. 29 . In the U nited Kingdom  registration is by partnerships and not by partners. 
V A T A  1983 sec. 30(1).
40 . SI 1985 /886 , Regs. 58(1) &  (4), 60(b). H ow ever, the U .K . C & E  com m issioners m ay allow or 
direct a person to com plete returns for a period o f one m onth. SI 1985 /886 , Reg. 58(l)(a). In  
addition, sm all businesses m ay account for and pay V A T  on an annual basis, the paym ents to be  
m ade in nine installm ents. SI 1988 /886 .
I f  the taxable period is three m onths but related corporations and other taxable persons are not 
required to have periods ending on the same m onth, costs could be channeled initially to the 
taxable person w hose taxable period ends first. Benefit from the purchase V A T  credit w ould  
thereby b e accelerated. In the U nited Kingdom , accounting periods are prescribed according to 
trade classifications, although the taxable person can apply for periods that fit into his financial 
year. C & E  N otice 700  (O ct. 1, 1987), paragraph 83.
A  staggered paym ent system  (as in the U nited Kingdom ) in which different taxable persons 
make their quarterly returns in different m onths ensures that purchase V A T  credit will oft en be  
m ade before the associated sales V A T  paym ent.
I f  a business expected to incur regularly large purchases, it w ould wish to arrange its V A T  
return periods so that they fell reasonably close to the dates w hen the purchases w ere incurred  
and paid for, to m inim ize a cash flow effect o f having to carry the purchase V A T .
41. See note 40  above.
42. Such a step w ould not b e  necessary if registration by divisions w ere freely available. The U .K . 
practice, how ever, is to make division registration freely available only w hen all divisions use the 
sam e tax period and m eet certain other requirem ents. V A T A  1983 sec. 31(1); C & E  Leaflet N o. 
7 0 0 /3 /8 7  paragraph 2.
43. V A T A  1983 sec. 29(5); C & E  Leaflet N o. 700 /2 /8 3  paragraph 9.
44 . I f  a corporate group has a subsidiary that predom inantly makes only zero-rated sales, the 
subsidiary could register separately and elect a one-m onth period while the rem ainder o f the 
group (registered together) w ould elect a three-m onth period. The group could then be struc­
tured to channel costs initially through the subsidiary accounting for tax on a m onthly basis (and 
obtaining a refund each month).
45. The U nited K ingdom  exem pts eleven activities (or groups), the principal ones being land (except 
sale o f land by a person “constructing a residential building”), insurance, finance, education, 
postal services, and health and welfare. V A T A  1983, 6  Sch. (Local governm ents or “ authorities” 
are effectively zero rated and not exem pted.) M any o f the U . K . exem ptions are required by law. 
E E C  Sixth D irective articles 13A , 13B . In contrast, N ew  Zealand exem pts only four activities or 
groups. N ew  Zealand G S T A  sec. 14. It does not exem pt insurance, education, postal services, or 
health and w elfare.
46. Certain kinds o f business activities m ight also be considered as being outside the V A T  (for 
exam ple, raising o f funds through issuance o f stock), with the result that input taxes are blocked  
and the activity has an exem ptlike status. See V A T A  1983, 6  Sch. 5(6); C & E  N otice N o. 706  (Apr. 
1987), paragraphs 9, 11.
47. The U .K . persons surveyed (81 percent, 65 percent— note 2) agreed that a registered nonretail 
business supplying goods has a significant advantage under the U .K . V A T  over its nonregistered  
com petitors.
48. The U .K . persons surveyed (72 percent, 50  percent— note 2) disagreed that the additional cost 
placed on dom estic U .K . finance because o f its exem pt status significantly encourages nonbank  
com panies to finance activities through equity instead o f bank loans. Further, the U .K . persons 
surveyed (79 percent, 48  percent) disagreed that such an additional cost significantly encourages 
U .K . banks to locate part o f their operations abroad to m inim ize taxable U .K . purchases.
A lso, the U .K . persons surveyed (88 percent, 65  percent) disagreed that the additional cost 
placed on dom estic U .K . insurance because o f its exem pt status significantly encouraged poten­
tial insurees to self-insure. In addition, the U .K . persons surveyed (72 percent, 4 6  percent) 
disagreed that such an additional cost significantly encouraged U .K . insurance com panies to 
locate part o f their operations abroad to m inim ize taxable U .K . purchases.
In this connection, in the U nited Kingdom  a business’s raising o f capital is in effect exem pt,
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thereby increasing any taxed costs o f financing by the V A T  rate. See C & E  N otice N o. 706  (Apr. 
1987), paragraphs 9 , 10, 11.
49. See note 66  below .
50. U nder the E E C  V A T  system s, financing through bank borrowing represents a supply by  the bank 
but financing through issuing shares represents a supply by the com pany and not by the new  
investors.
51. See note 48  above. A ssum ing that 40  percent o f the taxable outlays in providing dom estic 
insurance in the U nited K ingdom  is blocked, that a U .K . insurance com pany makes about a 10 
percent profit on its costs through insurance prem ium s, and that the blocked V A T  at 15 percent is 
passed through to custom ers, then about 5 .7  percent o f the dom estic insurance protection o f 
prem ium s is blocked V A T  in the U nited Kingdom .
52. The U . K . persons surveyed (63 percent, 52 percent— note 2) agreed that exem ption o f an entity 
or an activity significantly encourages tax avoidance by its self-supply o f its labor needs instead o f  
contracting for these labor needs through a taxable business.
53. For exam ple, should in-house legal or accounting services be taxed? I f  so, should the value o f  
those services include overhead?
54. SI 1981 /1741 article 14. The U .K . decision to take this self-supply was a political one, brought 
about by com plaints from  printers that they w ere likely to lose significant business otherw ise. 
The U . K . Treasury has broad authority to tax self-supply o f goods and services. V A T A  secs. 3(5), 
3(6), 3(7). See note 83 below .
The A B A  Tax Section V A T  C om m ittee Report (at pages 17 5 -1 7 7 ) contains a provision that 
perm its the taxing o f self-supply by  an exem pt activity “ to the extent provided in regulations.” 
Based on the U . K . experience, such regulatory authority is not likely to be exercised extensively  
and is likely to be exercised only because o f political pressure from  affected taxable suppliers.
55. V A T A  1983, 6A  Sch. paragraphs 5, 6 , added by  F A  1989, 3 Sch. The “value” o f the supply m ust be  
in excess o f £ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 . See also C & E  N ew s Release N o. 4 7 /88 , Consultation Paper: VAT on 
Non-Domestic Construction (June 21 , 1988), pt. D , in J .F . Avery Jones, Encyclopedia o f  Value 
Added Tax, 5 -8 8 4 . See also SI 1989 /472  (self-supply o f certain construction services subject to tax 
w hen the business using the facility is not fu lly taxable).
56. In the U nited Kingdom , w hen the insured’s property is repaired, the supply is deem ed to the 
insured and not to the insurer. C & E  Leaflet N o. 7 0 1 /36 /86  paragraph 15.
57. The U . K . persons surveyed (note 2) w ere generally evenly divided over w hether the exem ption  
o f an entity or an activity significantly encourages tax avoidance by its leasing o f expensive  
equipm ent fr om  a taxable person instead o f purchasing it.
58. See note 34 above and accom panying text.
59. The U . K . persons surveyed (note 2) w ere generally evenly divided over w hether the exem ption  
o f an entity or an activity significantly encourages tax avoidance by its purchasing o f shares o f  
stock o f a com pany with desirable assets instead o f direct purchase o f those assets. C & E  has the 
pow er to im pose open market value on transactions that have been undertaken betw een related  
parties at below -m arket value w hen the recipient is partially exem pt. See note 60  below .
60. In the U nited K ingdom , C & E  has the pow er to charge V A T  on the fair market value o f purchases 
by a person in an exem pt activity from  a related person. V A T A  1983, 4  Sch. 1(1); F A  1987 sec. 17.
61. The U .K . persons surveyed (90 percent, 61 percent— note 2) disagreed that the nonregistered  
status o f professional em ployees and their inability to claim purchase V A T  credit significantly 
encourages V A T  avoidance by  such persons’ incorporation o f their trades to perform  taxable 
services at fixed fees (for exam ple, by accountants who work at hom e).
62. The U .K . persons surveyed (71 percent, 59 percent— note 2) disagreed that the nonregistered  
status o f em ployees and their inability to claim purchase V A T  credit significantly encourages V A T  
avoidance by such persons’ having their em ployers purchase all or part o f their taxable supplies 
(for exam ple, tools o f trade that could give rise to purchase V A T  credit to the em ployer).
63. The A B A  Tax Section V A T  C om m ittee Report (at pages 32 and 33) recognizes the described  
potential for distortion o f econom ic decisions and describes possible approaches for avoiding or 
m inim izing this distortion. It adopts neither o f these approaches, how ever.
64. The 1984 Treasury Report (at p. 61) recom m ends required registration for all firms having an 
established place o f business or making m ore than casual sales. It does not recom m end exem p­
tion based on gross receipts or a similar criterion.
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65. VATA1983 sec. 48(1), 1 Sch. 1, 12; SI1989/470. Thisamount assumes a  conversion ratio o f $1.67: 
£1. Thus, the registration limit £23,600 is equivalent to $39,400 at such a conversion rate.
On March 31, 1989, there were approximately 1,624,000 registered persons in the United 
Kingdom. H.M. Customs and Excise 1989 Report, 52.
New Zealand requires registration when, during a twelve-month period, sales exceed 
NZ$24,000; it permits voluntary registration below this threshold. New Zealand GSTA sec. 51.
66. The U.K. persons surveyed (84 percent, 70 percent—note 2) agreed that if a retail business in a 
labor-intensive activity does not have to register, it has a significant advantage over a registered 
competitor.
67. In cases such as these, the United Kingdom considers the value of the product sold by the 
distributor to the salesperson to be the retail sales price and not the wholesale price paid by the 
salesperson. See C&E VAT Leaflet No. 700/16/82. Furthermore, if a business gives rewards of 
goods or services to agents and hostesses either free of charge or at specially discounted prices, 
VAT is generally to be accounted for on the basis of the open market value of such goods or 
services.
68. In the United Kingdom, the C&E commissioners have authority under specified avoidance 
conditions to aggregate the activities of individuals or corporations when they are part of the same 
business (that is, when the activities are not independent). VATA 1983, 1 Sch. paragraph 1A; FA
1986 sec. 10; C&E Press Notice No. 762 (Sept. 20, 1982); F314, Paul W. DeVoil, Value Added 
Tax (1989).
The U.K. persons surveyed (86 percent, 80 percent—note 2) agreed that the VAT advantage 
that a nonregistered retail business has over its registered competitors encourages a person’s 
incorporating different small businesses to avoid the U.K. threshold for required registration. 
The U.K. persons surveyed (79 percent, 48 percent) agreed that separate incorporation of a 
separate business of a company (with no group registration) would have a significant VAT 
advantage if the business performs retail services and would not have to register when separately 
incorporated. See also note 38 above.
69. Present U.K. law, which may conflict with the Sixth Directive of the European Economic 
Community, does not permit a credit for some prebusiness costs. SI 1985/886, Reg. 37; SI 
1987/510, Reg. 2; C&E Leaflet No. 700 (Oct. 1, 1987), paragraph 38.
70. Partial exemption rules could affect business decisions in ways other than noted in the text. For 
example, the U.K. persons surveyed (note 2) agreed that the partial exemption rules will 
significantly encourage taxpayers, in many cases, to segregate unrelated exempt and taxable 
activities into different entities (79 percent, 67 percent) and, in many others, to aggregate exempt 
and taxable activities into one company or to seek group registration for related companies (76 
percent, 61 percent).
71. The C&E is likely to follow the taxpayer’s non-VAT approach. It has authority to specify a method 
in order to secure a fair and reasonable apportionment. SI 1985/886, Regs. 30(1), 30(4); SI 
1987/510. It also has the authority to permit special allocation methods other than the standard 
method. SI 1985/886, Regs. 30(5), 36(2); SI 1987/510.
72. The U.K. persons surveyed (74 percent, 43 percent—note 2) agreed that separate incorporation 
of a separate business of a company (with no group registration) would have a significant VAT 
advantage if the business is exempt and the company would otherwise have to use the U.K. 
partial exemption rules.
73. This was the former U.K. rule. VATA 1983 sec. 15(1) (before amendment).
74. See note 7 above and the text accompanying note 179 below.
75. The model act of the ABA Tax Section VAT Committee Report, sec. 4011(e), uses an approach 
that modifies this formula for businesses engaged in gambling and other games of chance. This 
model act taxes gross receipts from games of chance reduced by payments to winners. The tax so 
computed is reduced by a credit for purchase VAT. The formula for determining the payable VAT 
would be—
(VAT Rate X  (Gross Receipts — Winners Payments)) — Purchase VAT
The report’s partial explanation (at pages 56-57) for this approach is that it taxes only the value 
added by the business. The approach is subject to criticism, however, because it generally results
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in gross receipts of a “retail” gambling business not being fully taxed. In contrast, the gross 
receipts of other retail businesses are in effect fully taxed, either at the retail level or at a prior 
level. (In the United Kingdom, games of chance are generally exempt (VATA 1983 sec. 17(1), 6 
Sch. group 4), perhaps because gambling is subject to a separate tax in the United Kingdom. In 
New Zealand, the amount received (that is, paid to participate) is subject to VAT. New Zealand 
GSTA sec. 5(10).)
76. The United Kingdom permits such an election. VATA 1983 sec. 14(1) and 7 Sch. paragraph 2(1); 
SI 1988/886.
77. EEC Sixth Council Directive article 26 (May 17, 1977); see SI 1987/1806 (tour operators order).
78. The requirement also avoids the need for tour operators to register in diff erent EEC countries.
79. It would ordinarily be far easier in cases involving interstate corporations for a purchaser to seek a 
credit based on the location of its purchase than on the location of its value added or the location of 
its sales.
80. NEDO Report, 38-39. The EEC Council Directive (article 18, paragraph 4 (May 17, 1977)) 
permits member states to carry forward excess credits (in lieu of a refund) “according to the 
conditions which they shall determine.”
81. See IRC secs. 1361-1379.
82. The lag system was used in France. See NEDO Report, 29.
83. SI 1981/1741 articles 2, 9. The U.K. persons surveyed (note 2) agreed that in the United Kingdom 
a tax on self-supply is justifiable in the following credit denial situations: (1) use of cars by a car 
manufacturer (92 percent, 72 percent), (2) operation by a manufacturer of a facility for entertain­
ing customers (77 percent, 52 percent), and (3) printing of forms by an exempt insurance 
company (69 percent, 52 percent). However, they were generally divided that in the United 
Kingdom a tax on self-supply is justifiable in the case of cleaning costs of an exempt insurance 
company for its headquarters building.
84. EEC Sixth Council Directive article 25 (May 17, 1977).
85. This approach was considered, but not recommended, by the 1984 Treasury Study at pages 
64—67 (agriculture) and 75 (certain construction). The U.K. persons surveyed (84 percent, 35 
percent—note 2) agreed that an imputed purchase VAT credit for purchases from certain 
partially exempt business taxpayers (for example, a credit for 9 percent of maritime-aviation- 
transportation insurance premiums paid to EEC insurance companies) could be effective in 
mitigating any harm caused by such partially exempt status.
86. See Smith, Webber, and Cerf, What You Should Know About the Value Added Tax, 23; Alan 
Tait, Value Added Tax 42-51 (London: McCraw Hill, 1972).
87. The U.K. persons surveyed (note 2) agreed (1) that an imputed purchase VAT credit based on 
wages paid (e.g., 15 percent of the first £10,000 of wages paid each employee) would effectively 
encourage the hiring of employees (76 percent, 63 percent), (2) that an imputed purchase VAT 
credit on the discovery value of specified minerals would effectively encourage exploration for 
such minerals (79 percent, 59 percent), and (3) that an imputed purchase VAT credit on wages 
paid in research and experimentation would effectively encourage research and experimentation 
(83 percent, 63 percent).
88. See Smith, Webber, and Cerf, 26. The model statute of the ABA Tax Section VAT Committee 
Report (at pages 10 and 11) argues for, and assumes, the granting of an immediate credit on 
capital purchases.
89. Availability or denial of the credit would obviously have an impact on the capital-labor mix in 
industries in which production factor coefficients were sufficiently elastic.
In the United Kingdom the Treasury by statutory instrument may deny the credit for purchase 
VAT (VATA 1983 sec. 14(10)), but this authority has been used sparingly. See note 91 below and 
accompanying text.
90. The EEC Sixth Council Directive (article 17, paragraph 7 (May 17, 1977)) recognizes that 
purchase VAT may have to be denied as a credit “for cyclical economic reasons.” See note 93. 
Denial of credits could also be used to favor an activity, product, or asset over a competing 
activity, product, or asset. For example, if the government wished to encourage rehabilitation of 
buildings over new construction, credits relating to new construction could be denied in whole or 
in part. In this connection, the U.K. persons surveyed (note 2) agreed that exempting new 
building construction (that is, denying credit to the constructor or the owner), but permitting
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credit for rehabilitation, would significantly encourage rehabilitation over new construction as to 
both commercial building (85 percent, 72 percent) and residential buildings (81 percent, 63 
percent).
91. As to automobiles, see SI 1980/442 article 4. As to entertainm ent, see SI 1981/1741 articles 2 and
9.
92. See note 98 below. The U .K . persons surveyed (note 2) disagreed that denial of the credit for 
purchase of cars in the United Kingdom has significantly discouraged the purchase of cars by 
business (80 percent, 76 percent) or effectively mitigates the eff ect of the income tax on personal 
use of business cars by owners and employees (69 percent, 54 percent), but they were generally 
divided that such a denial is a disproportionate response to the problem.
93. The U .K . persons surveyed (note 2) disagreed that denial of a credit for purchase VAT on a class of 
business assets would significantly discourage the purchase of such assets (54 percent, 43 
percent), but they agreed that such denial would significantly encourage leasing over purchasing 
of such assets when the lessor’s credit is not limited (73 percent, 59 percent) and would 
significantly encourage self-supply on such assets (assuming that self-supply is not subject to 
taxation) when high labor costs are involved (84 percent, 67 percent).
94. VATA 1983, 6A Sch ., a d d ed  by  FA 1989, 3 Sch.; see also note 55 and accompanying text.
95. As in the case of the income tax, one deviation from neutrality would serve to set off a chain 
reaction of nonneutral effects.
The acquisition and disposition of equity interests raises some difficult questions. Should the 
VAT apply to the transfer of noncash property to an entity in exchange for an equity interest? If  
the transfer is viewed as the equivalent of the sale of the property for cash and of the transfer of 
cash for the equity interest, the VAT arguably should apply if the sale of the property would be 
subject to VAT. I f  income tax law is any guide, there will be rules for noncoverage, but these will 
be more liberal in the case of partnerships. I f  a business sells or exchanges an equity interest, 
should the VAT apply to the disposition? Are the entity and the nature of its property, as in the 
case of a real estate partnership, material? Similarly, if the entity distributes noncash property to 
its shareholders or partners (whether or not in reduction of the owners’ pro rata equity interest), 
should the VAT apply to the transfer? (The United Kingdom would tax such a transfer. VATA 
1983, 2 Sch. 5(1)(3), 4 Sch. 7, 8.) Again, if income tax law is any guide, there will be different rules 
for partnerships and for corporations. I f  any of the foregoing transfers are not covered, the 
appropriate technique would seem to be zero rating. If, on the other hand, the foregoing 
transfers are covered, the transaction might give rise to no credit to the transferee or to a credit 
that is not immediately refundable. To the extent that the coverage rules for partnerships and for 
corporations differ, as in the case of the income tax law, the VAT will affect the choice o f business 
form.
96. Cf. E E C  Second Council Directive article 11(3) (April 11, 1967); E E C  Sixth Council D irective 
article 20(2) (May 17, 1977).
97. The U .K . persons surveyed (note 2) agreed that required amortization (in place of an immediate 
credit) of purchase VAT on a class of business assets would probably encourage leasing over 
purchasing of such assets if the lessor’s credit is not so limited (81 percent, 63 percent) and would 
probably encourage seff-supply of such assets (assuming that self-supply is not subject to taxation) 
when high labor costs are involved (83 percent, 65 percent). However, they were generally 
divided that such required amortization would probably discourage the purchase of such assets or 
would probably discourage excessive estimations of taxable use by a partially exempt taxpayer (as 
might occur if immediate credit were permitted).
98. Assets that could be acquired for mixed personal and business (or investment) reasons include 
automobiles, yachts, aircraft, personal computers, residences, farms, jew elry, antiques and 
other collectibles, and art.
The ABA Tax Section VAT Com m ittee Report (at pages 182 and 183) recommended a special 
status for an “investm ent custody account,” composed of investment assets and managed by a 
trustee to ensure that personal use cannot occur. Under this approach the purchase VAT credit 
would be granted currently on investment assets acquired by such a trust.
99. See note 148 below.
100. N ED O  Report, 34-35 .
101. Ibid ., 34.
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102. E.g., Smith, “Value-Added Tax: The Case for,” 82—84.
103. See General Accounting Off i ce, The Report o f the President’s Task Force on Business Taxation 
(Washington, D .C.: GAO, 1970), 68; Smith, Webber and Cerf, 86-89; McLure, “Economic 
Eff ects of Taxing Value Added,” 185-87.
104. VATA 1983, 5 Sch. 9, items 5, 6(a); C&E Notice No. 741 (June 1987). Arrangements exist under 
the EEC Eighth Directive whereby tax incurred in one member state can be reclaimed in a 
second, so that taxable recipients of such services are no worse off than if the services had been 
supplied by someone in the second state. EEC Eighth Council Directive article 2 (Dec. 6 ,  1979).
105. The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs may impose restrictions.
106. See note 116 below.
107. The United Kingdom permits such an election. VATA 1983, 7 Sch. 2(3A); SI 1987/1427; C&E 
Notice No. 731 (Oct. 1987). Other provisions that may benefit small business in the United 
Kingdom are (1) no required registration if gross receipts do not exceed £23,600 (VATA 1983 sec. 
48(1), 1 Sch. 1, 12; SI 1987/438), (2) voluntary registration for persons not required to register 
(VATA 1983, 1 Sch. paragraphs 11(1)(b), 11(2A), 11(3); FA 1984 sec. 12(2)), and (3) annual returns 
with payments on account (VATA 1983 sec. 14(1) and 7 Sch. 2(1); SI 1988/886).
108. IRC secs. 263(c) (intangible drilling and development costs), 611-614 (depletion).
109. See Joseph Sneed, “The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, ” Stanford Law Review 17 (1965): 
567; 1984 Treasury Report, vol. 1, chap. 2.
110. See note 12 and appendixes A, B, and C above (pages 39, 41, and 43) for the European 
experience.
111. For the fiscal year ending March 31, 1988, the cost of administering the U.K. VAT was 1.02 
percent o f revenues collected. H.M. Customs and Excise 1988 Report. In contrast, the net 
compliance costs (after positive benefits such as cash flow) of the U.K. VAT to business are 
estimated at about four times the costs of administration. These compliance costs vary according 
to the type and size o f the business involved. See Cedric Sanford et al., Costs and Benefits o f VAT 
(Great Britain: Heinemann Educational Books, 1981).
112. The model statute of the ABA Tax Section VAT Committee Report (at page 11) argues for, and 
assumes, accommodation of social and economic concerns outside the VAT.
The U.K. experience has been that VAT has not involved frequent fine-tuning adjustments in 
rates, perhaps because the large number of small traders has made frequent fine-tuning inadvis­
able. In the United Kingdom, a higher rate of VAT was introduced in 1974 partly for regulatory 
purposes, was reduced in 1976, and was abolished in 1979.
The VAT rate could be inflexible upwards, because a government would be reluctant to adopt a 
policy that feeds visibly into the inflation rate (as would the VAT if it is passed on to the 
consumer).
113. The U.K. experience is instructive. See notes 4 and 12 above.
114. For another view of the design of a VAT, see William Turnier, “ Designing an Efficient Value 
Added Tax,” Tax Law Review 39 (1984): 435.
115. The U.K. persons surveyed (note 2) were questioned about the elements of an efficient and 
effective VAT in the context of real estate. They generally agreed about the following elements 
suggested to them: (1) standard rated: civil engineering works (87 percent, 72 percent), new 
construction and improvements (78 percent, 63 percent), repairs (92 percent, 76 percent), and 
rental of commercial (including transient rental) (94 percent, 67 percent); (2) exempt: unim­
proved value of land (70 percent, 46 percent), subsequent sales (“used buildings”) (65 percent, 52 
percent), and residential rental (71 percent, 54 percent); (3) nontaxable: imputed rental value of 
owner-occupied residences (91 percent, 70 percent); and (4) special provision: change fr om 
owner-occupied residential to commercial, or vice versa (82 percent, 39 percent).
116. The U.K. persons surveyed agreed (note 2) that it would be significantly ineff icient either (1) to 
specify a lower rate on certain purchases by an exempt or nontaxed entity or activity (90 percent, 
80 percent) or (2) to specify a lower rate on certain purchases by a partially exempt entity or 
activity (95 percent, 83 percent). In this connection, techniques could be sought to minimize this 
inefficiency (for example, by giving the entity or activity a special registration number). The EEC 
is now recognizing that in its situation a range of rates is not desirable. A recommendation being 
considered is for two rates (other than the zero rate), that is, a lower rate (4 percent to 9 percent) 
and a standard rate (14 percent to 20 percent). The more positive VAT rates there are, the more
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complex the taxable person’s accounts have to be. As a result, (1) compliance and administrative 
costs will rise, (2) possibilities of innocent error increase, and (3) possibilities of deliberate 
misstatement increase.
117. The 1984 Treasury Report (at pages 49-53) expresses reservations about exempting banks, 
savings associations, and insurance companies. It unqualifiedly recommends exemption only in 
limited cases. For example, it recommends exemption of taxi service. See 1984 Treasury Report,
55. See notes 20 and 45 above for the practice in the United Kingdom and in New Zealand.
The U.K. persons surveyed (92 percent, 78 percent—note 2) agreed that minimal use of 
exemptions and zero rating will substantially promote eff i ciency. However, as to the major 
zero-rated groups (pre-Finance Bill of 1989), their expressions o f support for the proposition that 
the standard rating of each would substantially promote efficiency were not as strong: food 
(agreed 67 percent, 48 percent); sewerage services and water (divided) (limited by the Finance 
Bill of 1989 to nonbusiness customers); books, magazines, and other printed matter (agreed 74 
percent, 50 percent); fu el and power (agreed 64 percent, 39 percent) (limited by the Finance Bill 
of 1989 to residential and charitable use); buildings and civil engineering works (agreed 76 
percent, 54 percent) (limited by the Finance Bill of 1989 to construction for residential or 
charitable purposes); and exports (disagreed 68 percent, 46 percent). Moreover, as to the 
following major exempted groups previously identified (note 45 above), their expressions of 
support for the proposition that the standard or zero rating of each would substantially promote 
efficiency were also not as strong: land (agreed 79 percent, 50 percent), insurance (agreed 86 
percent, 54 percent), postal services (agreed 58 percent, 33 percent), finance (agreed 78 percent, 
46 percent), education (agreed 64 percent, 35 percent), and health and welfare (agreed 58 
percent, 30 percent).
118. The U.K. persons surveyed (note 2) differed over whether domestic insurance should be 
exempted. They also differed over whether, as an alternative to exemption of insurance, 
premiums should be subject to a low rate (for example, one percent), with no VAT being charged 
on payments for damages and with the insurance company being entitled to full credit for its 
purchase VAT. However, they disagreed (70 percent, 35 percent) that if domestic insurance is 
exempt, purchase VAT on insurance premiums should be imputed to taxable insureds, in 
recognition of the VAT content in insurance premiums. The U.K. practitioners surveyed also 
differed over whether, if domestic insurance is exempt and foreign insurance is zero rated, a 
uniform (insurance industrywide) percentage or uniform percentages should be developed 
apportioning purchase VAT of insurance companies between domestic and foreign.
119. Insurance companies and banks are highly computerized, and there should be no problem in 
applying the VAT to their operations.
Suggestions have been made in the EEC (and are being pursued in the United Kingdom) that 
the VAT be levied on bank charges other than interest, by use of the option to tax that is currently 
available. EEC Sixth Directive articles 13B(d), 13C.
120. The U.K. persons surveyed (88 percent, 80 percent—note 2) agreed that zero rating an activity is 
justifiable for social reasons, to minimize the impact of VAT on the activity. However, they 
disagreed that zero rating an activity is justifiable (1) only if difficult administrative or compliance 
problems are not created thereby (68 percent, 54 percent), (2) when the VAT is difficult to apply 
(73 percent, 59 percent), (3) when the activity has both business and nonbusiness customers and 
when its purchase VAT is not significant in relation to its total purchases (69 percent, 52 percent), 
or (4) when there are a large number of small suppliers and the amount of goods purchased by 
each is not significant (76 percent, 54 percent). The U.K. persons surveyed (58 percent, 48 
percent—note 2) agreed that exempting an activity is justifiable only if difficult administrative or 
compliance problems are not created thereby. They also agreed on the following rationales for 
exemption: (1) when necessary to minimize the impact of VAT on an activity (77 percent, 65 
percent), (2) when the VAT is difficult to apply (62 percent, 52 percent), and (3) when the activity 
has both business and nonbusiness customers and when its purchase VAT is not significant in 
relation to its total purchases (59 percent, 41 percent). However, they disagreed (55 percent, 39 
percent) that exemption is desirable when there are a large number of small suppliers and the 
amount of goods purchased is not significant.
121. See note 118 above.
122. The U.K. persons surveyed (note 2) disagreed that the return period for the largest companies
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should be one month (73 percent, 65 percent) but agreed that the return period for the smallest 
companies should be one year (61 percent, 59 percent).
123. Under the European forfait system, the business remits estimated taxes (based on the prior 
years’ results) over a ten-month period, with an end-of-year adjustment based on the end-of-year 
determination of value added.
The U.K. persons surveyed (76 percent, 63 percent— note 2) agreed that the forfait system 
would work efficiently for small business. The forfait system is not dissimilar to the U.K. annual 
accounting system, which only some 5,000 businesses have chosen to use. VATA 1983 sec. 14(1); 
FA 1987 sec. 11(1); SI 1988/886.
124. See note 40 above and accompanying text.
125. The U.K. persons surveyed (note 2) disagreed that a company should be required to use the 
invoice method or the cash method, depending on the method used in preparing either the 
company’s financial statements (70 percent, 41 percent) or its income tax returns (75 percent, 46 
percent).
126. C f. IRC sec. 267(a)(2).
127. In the United Kingdom auditing is not done extensively using invoices. Instead, auditing 
techniques similar to those under the income tax are used (for example, analysis of accounts). 
Further, the U.K. VAT does not rely on invoices under certain of the retail schemes. See also 
note 128.
Giving central importance to the invoice may make the revenue agency reluctant to deal with 
techniques that are not invoice-related (for example, the imputed credit on used property). See 
textual discussion relating to note 181.
128. But see note 125 above. Although the U.K. VAT is based on different timing rules than the U.K. 
income tax, this difference was largely mandated by EEC rules in 1972, when the U.K. VAT was 
enacted. See EEC Second Council Directive articles 5.5, 6.4 (April 11, 1967), replaced by EEC 
Sixth Council Directive article 10.2 (May 17, 1977).
129. If the credit allowed for purchase VAT on capital goods is to be amortized over the useful life of 
the property, the income tax useful lives could be used for VAT purposes, or vice versa.
130. The U.K. persons surveyed (69 percent, 54 percent—note 2) agreed that it is possible to 
construct a VAT system based on each taxpayer’s accounting records when the system does not 
place primary emphasis on invoices. Of those in agreement, most also agreed that such a system 
would not impose disproportionate administrative costs on C&E (60 percent) and would result in 
substantial savings in compliance costs (62 percent).
131. Required information on U.K. invoices is limited to eleven items. Reg. 13, SI 1985/886; C&E 
Notice No. 700 paragraph 47 (Oct. 1, 1987). The U.K. persons surveyed (61 percent, 48 
percent—note 2) disagreed that C&E requirements for information on the invoices are too 
extensive.
132. The U.K. persons surveyed (83 percent, 63 percent—note 2) agreed that VAT definitions and 
concepts, except when impractical, should be based on accounting concepts. However, they 
disagreed that they should be based on income tax concepts (66 percent, 46 percent) and differed 
on the desirability o f being based on customs (C&E) concepts.
The U.K. persons surveyed (note 2) agreed that the definitions of the following items create 
substantial taxpayer confusion: children’s clothing (79 percent, 57 percent), builders’ fixtures (89 
percent, 72 percent), and printed matter (69 percent, 48 percent). They were not interviewed on 
other definitions. The U.K. persons surveyed (note 2) agreed that the U. K. rules in the following 
areas would o f necessity require that professional assistance be available to smaller business: 
retail schemes (73 percent, 48 percent), compound supplies (involving products subject to 
different VAT treatment) (77 percent, 59 percent), partial exemption (92 percent, 78 percent), 
international services (86 percent, 70 percent), and business/nonbusiness distinctions (83 per­
cent, 63 percent). They were not interviewed about other areas of potential complexity.
133. See Turnier, “Designing an Efficient Value Added Tax,” 458-60; note 65 above (practice in the 
United Kingdom and New Zealand). But see note 64.
The U.K. persons surveyed (83 percent, 63 percent—note 2) agreed that increasing the 
required registration level to £50,000 (presently at £23,600) would substantially promote efficien­
cy, but they were generally divided over the efficiency of permitting small businesses to register 
(when not otherwise required to register). However, they were nearly unanimous (97 percent, 76
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percent) that if such small businesses are permitted to elect to register, there should be neither a 
rebate to them to meet compliance costs nor a charge to them to meet administrative costs.
134. Deregistration should probably give rise to a partial or complete recapture of purchase VAT 
credits on existing property. Similarly, registration should arguably give rise to a partial or 
complete granting of purchase VAT credits on existing property. The United Kingdom provides 
for these results. VATA 1983, 2 Sch. 7 and 4 Sch. 7; VATA 1983 sec. 14(9)(b); SI 1985/886, Reg. 
37; SI 1987/510, Reg. 2. See section titled “Changed Use” in chapter 4. The United Kingdom also 
permits “intending traders” to register, thereby permitting such persons a current purchase VAT 
credit. VATA 1983, 1 Sch. 5, 5A; FA 1988 Sec. 14(4); SI 1985/886, Regs. 5-7.
135. The U. K. VAT permits voluntary registration under specified circumstances. VATA 1983, 1 Sch. 
paragraphs 11(1)(b), 11(2A), 11(3); FA 1984 sec. 12(2).
136. See note 133 above.
137. In the United Kingdom the VAT is administered by C&E while the income tax is administered by 
Inland Revenue. However, the reasons for the U.K. arrangement are largely that the U.K. VAT 
replaced the purchase tax administered by C&E and that at the time of enactment of the VAT the 
Inland Revenue was burdened by recent substantial changes in the income tax law. Moreover, 
the VAT was viewed as a transactions tax calling for emphasis on physical evidence (i.e., 
invoices).
The U.K. persons surveyed (note 2) agreed or disagreed with the following statements about 
C&E and its practices: disagreed that C&E has sufficient staff (64 percent, 50 percent), disagreed 
that staff compensation is sufficient (87 percent, 74 percent), disagreed that computer power of 
C&E is suff icient (67 percent, 52 percent), agreed that C&E notices are adequate and helpful (67 
percent, 61 percent), and agreed that detailed provisions should be dealt with through delegated 
or primary legislation and not through notices and leaflets (76 percent, 67 percent). They were 
generally divided that filings (including tax returns) should be with the local office.
138. The ABA Tax Section VAT Committee Report (at pages 166-174) does not have a final position 
on banking and insurance intermediation services. In this connection, such services in the 
domestic market are exempted by the United Kingdom and zero rated in the international 
market. See VATA 1983 secs. 7, 16, 5 Sch. paragraph 9(6)(b)-(d), 6 Sch. paragraphs 2, 5.
Further, the model act of the ABA Tax Section VAT Committee Report (sec. 4014 and pages 
81-86) exempts property or services furnished by a government entity or an income tax-exempt 
entity when no charge is imposed (and to the extent to be provided in regulations, when only a 
nominal charge is imposed). Thus, the provision of police protection would generally be ex­
empted, while the provision o f water (for which a reasonable charge is made) would be fully 
taxable. The covered entities could thus be wholly or partially exempted. See note 119 above.
139. If exemption were being considered for domestic financial services performed by banks, savings 
associations, insurance companies, and other lending businesses, the revenue to be collected 
under the exemption approach could be estimated (that is, the noncreditable purchase VAT of 
these businesses). In place of exemption of these businesses, a low VAT rate could be set on 
interest and other charges of lending businesses that (after credits to business purchasers) would 
approximate the revenue to be collected under the exemption approach. Lenders who would be 
subject to the low VAT rate would have to be defined because other lenders would presumably be 
exempt (or not registered) as to their lending activities. Alternatively, all lenders would be 
subject to the low VAT rate (with special VAT withholding by the “borrower” for savings 
accounts, certificates of deposit, and securities), but limitations on purchase VAT credit would be 
imposed.
140. See note 118 above.
141. Cf. IRC sec. 280F. The 1984 Treasury Report (at page 83) stated that there is merit in disallowing 
the credit for VAT paid by a firm for meals and drinks under all circumstances and that the same 
policy should be considered for automobiles. The ABA Tax Section VAT Committee (at pages 
161-163) recommends that when the owner of a business makes personal use of its property or 
services, the fair market value of the use (and not its cost to the business) be subject to the VAT. It 
does not recommend as an alternative either that the business’s credit for purchase VAT relating 
thereto be denied and the owner’s use not be taxed (in effect, exempting the transaction) or that 
the cost to the business of the property or service be the measure of its value. A comparable 
problem is presented under the federal income tax. When personal use is made of assets of a 
corporation by a shareholder, the shareholder will generally be taxed on a dividend or compensa­
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tion under IRC sec. 61 equal to the value of such use. In contrast, when personal use is made of 
assets of an unincorporated proprietorship by its owner, deductions could be limited or denied 
under such IRC sections as 162, 183, and 280A. The two approaches of the federal income tax are 
probably simpler to administer than the ABA Tax Section VAT Committee Report approach, 
without consideration of other circumstances, in those cases in which the entire credit for 
purchase VAT is not to be denied.
142. The United Kingdom taxes self-supply of automobiles by manufacturers and dealers. The United 
Kingdom does not tax automobiles used by manufacturers for research and development pur­
poses. VATA 1983 sec. 3(5); SI 1980/442 article 5. Complications potentially arise if the final user 
is a nonleasing business that permits its owners or employees to use the automobile. Strict 
adherence to theory would require that VAT be charged on the rental value of the automobile to 
the owner or employee and that the business be given a credit for part of its purchase VAT. 
However, except in the case of the manufacturer and dealers permitting owner and employee 
use, a strict adherence to theory may prove inefficient. In the United Kingdom, by special 
concession VAT is imposed on owner and employee use of automobiles only on any charges 
made. C&E Leaflet 700 (Oct. 1, 1987), appendix C, paragraphs 6, 7. This concession seems 
contrary to VATA 1983, 2 Sch. paragraph 5(1),(3).
143. See notes 83 and 91 and accompanying text.
144. Although the U.K. VAT was enacted in 1972, the United Kingdom did not make a proposal to 
deal with changed use until 1988. See Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise, Consultation Paper: 
VAT-Input Tax: Origin and Scope o f the Right to Deduction o f Input on Capital Goods: 
Adjustment After the Initial Deduction (London: C&E, 1988), announced in C&E Press Notice 
No 9/88, (Feb. 29, 1988). A draft statutory instrument has been proposed and circulated among 
interested parties. The proposed coverage of the draft statutory instrument is limited. (See note 
148 below.) The EEC Sixth Council Directive (article 20 (May 17, 1977)) contemplates an 
adjustment period of only five years, which may be extended to ten years in the case of 
immovable property. See text accompanying note 99.
If rates have changed, the credit to be granted or recaptured upon conversion of property 
could be determined under the new rates. The prior purchase VAT could be determined under 
the new rates. The prior purchase VAT could be converted by multiplying it by the following 
fr action: new rate/prior rate. However, it is desirable to use the prior rates (and not recompute 
the prior credit), in part because this approach is simpler than converting to the new rate but also 
because it is fair. See note 146 below.
145. The U.K. draft statutory instrument will aff ect only a relatively small number of changed use 
transactions. See note 148 below; see also note 146 below.
146. Under changes made by the Finance Bill of 1989 (applicable generally to buildings constructed 
after April 1, 1989) the United Kingdom generally standard rates construction of buildings but 
continues to zero rate construction solely for residential or charitable purposes. VATA 1983, 5 
Sch. group 8. (In the United Kingdom, therefore, construction for residential and charitable 
purposes is favored.) Change of a building’s use from solely residential or charitable purposes 
within ten years after its construction will give rise to standard rating (that is, a recapture) (which 
will adversely impact exempt activities) under diff erent approaches: (1) The conversion of a 
zero-rated building to a nonqualifying purpose (that is, not solely a residential or charitable 
purpose) will be treated as a self-supply subject to taxation under the rates and valuation existing 
at the time of construction. VATA 1983, 6A Sch. paragraphs 4-6. Thus, although the U.K. law 
uses the original rates and valuation, it does not utilize the earning-out technique described in 
the text. (2) Further, if a person sells a zero-rated building and if the purchaser is to use the 
property for a purpose other than solely residential or charitable, the sale is standard rated and 
not exempted. VATA 1983, 6A Sch. paragraphs 2, 3. In this context U.K. law thus does not use 
the original rates and valuation but uses the fair market value technique described in the text. (3) 
However, a change to solely residential or charitable purposes for a building does not give rise to 
zero rating (that is, a granting of a credit). See also note 55 above and the accompanying text.
147. The ABA Tax Section VAT Committee Report (at pages 100-101 and 113) would permit credit for 
purchase VAT on the shift from exempt to taxable use, apparently for the full purchase VAT. The 
credit for purchase VAT apparently would not be reduced to take into account the length of the 
exempt use or any decrease in value of the property.
148. The earning-out technique has been proposed in the U.K. See Her Majesty’s Customs and
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Excise, Consultation Paper: VAT-Input Tax: Origin and Scope o f the Right to Deduction o f Input 
Tax on Capital Goods: Adjustment After the Initial Deduction (London: C&E, 1988), and draft 
statutory instrument (not yet introduced). See C&E Press Notice No. 9/88 (Feb. 29, 1988). The 
draft statutory instrument will only affect real estate with a value in excess of £250,000 and 
computer equipment with a value in excess of £50,000. Cf. authorities cited in note 134 above 
(preregistration purchase VAT and deregistration).
The U.K. persons surveyed (65 percent, 48 percent— note 2) agreed that in dealing with the 
problem of changing use, it would be efficient to grant an immediate credit (in the period of 
purchase) based on estimated use, subject to recapture based on actual use over a specified 
period. They generally differed, however, over the proposition that if initial use is exempt or 
partially exempt the potential credit for purchase VAT must be amortized over a specified period 
and allowed based on actual use each period. Finally, they agreed (76 percent, 48 percent) that 
the relevant period for recapture or amortization should be five years for all assets and disagreed 
(74 percent, 37 percent) that it should be five years for personalty and ten years for realty. See also 
note 146 above.
149. C f IRC sec. 460(b)(3) (look-back method).
150. In the United Kingdom, if  business goods (or other goods for which a credit has been granted) are 
put to private use on either a permanent or a temporary basis, purchase VAT is due. VATA 1983, 
2 Sch. paragraph 5(1)-n5(3), 4 Sch. paragraphs 7, 8. But see notes 142 (private use of business 
automobiles) and 146 (construction for residential or charitable purposes) above.
A third technique would be to treat the conversion fr om taxable to exempt or personal use as a 
lease by a taxable person to someone for an exempt or personal use. However, this technique 
raises substantial administrative and compliance problems in determining a fair rental. Further, 
the effect of this technique is principally to defer remittance of the VAT, if the prior purchase 
VAT credit is not disturbed but the imputed lease rentals give rise to noncreditable VAT. (This 
statement is based on the assumption that purchases of property for lease for exempt or personal 
use will give rise to a current credit. However, if purchases of property for lease for exempt or 
personal use would give rise to a deferred credit and not to an immediate credit, consistency 
requires that on conversion treated as a lease, the prior purchase VAT should be recaptured and 
the conversion transaction treated as a purchase for re-lease. Thus, the imputed purchaser- 
lessor’s purchase VAT credit would be amortized and would largely match the VAT charged on 
the imputed rentals.)
151. The ABA Tax Section VAT Committee Report, sec. 4038, adopts this approach.
152. Notes 148 and 150 above.
153. This technique is being considered by the United Kingdom in dealing with the problem of mixed 
use, but without adjustments to the initial (unearned) credit. See note 148 above; see also note 
146 above.
154. C f IRC sec. 460(b)(3) (look-back method). Determination of interest would increase administra­
tive and compliance problems. Cf. IRC sec. 1273.
155. Taxpayers will be encouraged to give reasonable estimations of taxable and exempt or personal 
use. However, the charging of interest will not discourage the use of leasing subsidiaries and 
other related parties purchasing property for re-lease for exempt or personal use.
156. According to one U.K. practitioner, experience in the United Kingdom suggests that when the 
third method (earning out, estimated initial use subject to adjustment) is introduced, taxable 
persons making large capital purchases will consider establishment of “in house” leasing opera­
tions to obtain an initial 100 percent credit and to eliminate the administrative complexities of 
accounting for VAT over the period of adjustment. (The United Kingdom does not have the 
equivalent of anti-avoidance measures proposed in the discussion in the section titled “Leases 
and Deferred Payment Sales.”)
157. See discussion of mixed use property in the section titled “Changed Use” (the discussion to which 
notes 144 through 156 relate). For other possible deferred credit situations, see “Amortization” 
in the section titled “Capital Goods” (the discussion to which notes 96 through 98 relate).
158. Cf. IRC sec. 178 (amortization of cost of acquiring a lease over its life).
159. See text accompanying notes 154 and 155.
160. C f IRC secs. 269, 269A, 1561-1563.
161. See text accompanying notes 89-92.
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162. See text accompanying notes 45-79.
163. See text accompanying note 9.
164. See note 91 and accompanying text.
165. Cf. IRC secs. 46(e)(3)(B), 48(d)(4)(C), 168(h)(1)(C) (definitions of a short-term lease).
166. Cf. IRC secs. 168(h) (new), 168(j) (old) (leases to tax-exempt organizations).
167. Cf. IRC sec. 178 (amortization of cost of acquiring a lease over its life).
168. The United Kingdom requires the current remittance of the full sales VAT on deferred payment 
sales. VATA 1983, 2 Sch. paragraph 1(2); VATA 1983 secs. 4, 5(1).
169. IRC secs. 483 (d)(3), 483(e)(5), 1274(c)(3), 1274A(b), 1274A(c)(2)(A).
170. Cf. IRC secs. 269, 269A, 1561-1563.
171. Mixed use property is within the VAT ring to the extent that the credit for purchase VAT thereon 
has been granted (and not recaptured). It is outside the ring to the extent that credit has been 
deferred or denied (including any recapture of credit). (See section titled “Changed Use” in 
chapter 4.)
172. It would also be appropriate for the business seller to claim any remaining deferred credit on the 
sold property.
173. The European Commission of the EEC has published a draft proposal for a harmonized 
treatment of used goods throughout the EEC.
174. For example, an income tax surcharge could be imposed on covered dispositions. Other methods 
for increasing the income tax on covered dispositions would be to deny a stepped-up basis on 
death, deny nonrecognition provisions, or deny both, in computing the regular income tax or any 
special surcharge on covered dispositions. In addition, if favorable capital gains treatment is 
restored, this treatment could be denied on covered dispositions.
175. See section titled “Exemption” in chapter 1.
176. Exemption could also not be made available to mixed use property.
177. See note 8 above.
178. Automobiles, certain collectibles (works of art, antiques, and collector’s pieces), motorcycles, 
motor homes, boats and outboard motors, aircraft, electric organs, firearms, and horses and 
ponies. VATA 1983 sec. 18; SI 1980/442; SI 1981/1741; and SI 1983/1099. The U.K. persons 
surveyed (note 2) disagreed that there is a substantial double VAT taxation because of the failure 
to extend the margin scheme to used computers (68 percent, 46 percent) or scrap metal (68 
percent, 37 percent).
179. See note 8 and the text accompanying note 74.
180. However, the business could be given a credit upon its eventual disposition of the property.
181. See note 127 and accompanying text. The U.K. persons surveyed (61 percent, 30 percent—note 
2) disagreed that the U.K. margin scheme on used goods should be replaced with an approach 
that imputes a fully creditable purchase VAT for used consumer goods.
182. See note 174 above.
183. The U. K. government has proposed that the fifth technique be used for mixed use assets having 
an initial purchase price above a de minimis amount (not specified). Her Majesty’s Customs and 
Excise, Consultation Paper: VAT-Input Tax: Origin and Scope o f the Right to Deduction o f Input 
Tax on Capital Goods: Adjustment After the Initial Deduction (London: C&E, 1988). See C&E 
Press Notice No. 9/88 (Feb. 29, 1988). A draft statutory instrument has been proposed and 
circulated among interested parties. The proposed coverage of the draft statutory instrument is 
limited. (See note 148 above; see also note 146 above.)
184. The United Kingdom has proposed this approach for mixed use property. See note 183; see also 
note 153 and accompanying text; in addition, see note 146 above.
185. A type of inflation adjustment could result if interest were payable on any deferred credit not 
previously allowed.
186. An example o f this inequity is as follows: Assume that the threshold amount is $50,000 and that 
the VAT rate is 10 percent. Assume further that A, a nondealer, purchased an antique car for 
$30,000 from a dealer in antique cars and thus had to pay purchase VAT of $3,000. A later sold this 
antique car for $45,000 to B, another nondealer, and did not have to collect sales VAT because B 
is a nondealer. Finally, B sold the antique car to C (who is either a dealer or a nondealer) for 
$60,000. B must collect $6,000 from C under the revived credit technique and must also remit 
$6,000 because no VAT was paid by B on his prior purchase.
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187. The 1984 Treasury Report (at pages 79 and 80) apparently recommends exemption in most out-in 
situations. However, in the case of used automobiles it recommends the imputed credit. In 
contrast, the ABA Tax Section VAT Committee Report (at pages 102—107) recommends the 
imputed credit for out-in situations.
The 1984 Treasury Report would apparently exempt out-out situations. See 1984 Treasury 
Report, 77. In contrast, the ABA Tax Section VAT Committee Report (at pages 24—25, 76, and 
110-114) exempts out-out situations involving a consideration below a threshold amount (to be 
specified) and gives rise to a revived credit for other out-out situations.
188. See the discussion in the sections titled “The Credit” and “Capital Goods” in chapter 1 and 
“Changed Use,” “Leases and Deferred Payment Sales,” and “Used Property” in chapter 4.
189. An alternative approach under the federal income tax is to ignore the denied or recaptured credit 
(the “ ignore” approach). Thus, a denied or recaptured credit would be neither deductible nor 
capitalizable. Subsequent VAT allowance of an unused VAT credit (previously denied or recap­
tured) would not give rise to taxable income. Although the “ignore” approach is appealing for its 
simplicity, it is probably not acceptable because it in effect treats the unused VAT credit as a 
penalty.
A second alternative approach would treat the denied or recaptured VAT credit as an expense, 
potentially deductible under IRC secs. 162 and 212. However, an unused credit on personal use 
assets, which is not deductible, would not be capitalized (the “maybe deduct but don’t capitalize” 
approach). (A variation of this approach would permit a deduction under IRC sec. 164 for all 
unused VAT credits, subject to general limitations such as those on itemized deductions under 
IRC sec. 63(b).) Later VAT allowance of an unused VAT credit would give rise to income under 
the tax benefit rule. The “maybe deduct but don’t capitalize ” approach is more complicated than 
the “ ignore” approach but is more equitable. Nevertheless, it is probably not acceptable because 
in many cases it grants an immediate deduction for a capitalizable cost.
190. An alternative would be to reduce the VAT credit by an amount representing the approximate 
federal income tax benefit and not to require an income inclusion under the federal income tax.
191. Alternatively, a deferred credit could be treated as a denied credit. (See the paragraph accom­
panying notes 189 and 190.) This approach is not satisfactory because it would give rise to 
substantial complexity when the deferred credit is allowed by the VAT and the tax benefit rule 
must be applied.
192. To the extent that this credit is capitalized as the cost of an asset placed in service in an earlier 
year, future depreciation alone could reflect the increased cost. Alternatively, an appropriate 
part of the capitalized cost could be attributed to prior years and either be deducted in the year of 
VAT denial or give rise to deductions in the years in which the asset was used (requiring the filing 
of amended income tax returns or a procedure comparable to the procedure of IRC sec. 1341).
193. The U. K. persons surveyed (note 2) were asked about the perception of the general public toward 
the U.K. VAT. They agreed (1) that the U.K. VAT is perceived by the general public to be fair, 
insofar as there is a perception (61 percent, 50 percent), (2) that the U.K. VAT is perceived by the 
general public to be more fair than the U.K. income tax (62 percent, 39 percent), and (3) that 
requiring retail sales to be stated VAT-inclusive effectively hides the VAT from the general public 
(63 percent, 57 percent).
194. Other matters of concern include the treatment of bad debts (discussed in chapter 1 in the section 
titled “Cash Flow Effects of the VAT”) and the treatment of employee purchases of items relating 
to a trade (discussed in chapter 1 in the section titled “Exemption ”). The U.K. persons surveyed 
(note 2) were asked if the U.K. VAT operates unfairly in three areas. They agreed that it operates 
unfairly as to bad debts (81 percent, 65 percent) (see paragraph accompanying note 33) but 
differed over whether it operates unfairly either (1) as to substantial purchases by an employee of 
assets or services to be used in his or her employment (see notes 61-63 and accompanying text) or 
(2) as to substantial purchases by a nonregistered, nonretail business of taxable assets or services 
to be used in the business (see notes 47—48 and accompanying text).
Imposition of the VAT on charities (through the denial of purchase VAT under their exempt 
status) could also be an area of concern, as could a high registration threshold with no procedure 
for voluntary registration.
195. See the 1984 Treasury Report, 89-111.
196. As to the major zero-rated groups previously identified (note 20 above), the U.K. persons
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surveyed (note 2) agreed or disagreed that each group substantially promotes progressivity in the 
U. K. VAT, as follows: food (agreed 90 percent, 61 percent); sewerage services and water (agreed 
69 percent, 39 percent); books, magazines, and other printed matter (agreed 58 percent, 33 
percent); fuel and power (agreed 87 percent, 57 percent); buildings and civil engineering works 
(agreed 60 percent, 33 percent); and exports (disagreed 70 percent, 41 percent).
As to the major exempted groups previously identified (note 45 above), the U.K. persons 
surveyed (note 2) agreed or disagreed that each group substantially promotes progressivity in the 
U.K. VAT, as follows: land (disagreed 63 percent, 33 percent), insurance (disagreed 62 percent, 
35 percent), postal services (generally differed), finance (disagreed 68 percent, 37 percent), 
education (agreed 74 percent, 37 percent), and health and welfare (agreed 79 percent, 41 
percent).
When questioned about alternatives to zero rating and exemption to promote progressivity, 
the U.K. persons surveyed (70 percent, 41 percent—note 2) disagreed that progressivity can 
better be promoted by giving an imputed credit to the taxpayer for wages paid (and for 
self-employment income) up to a certain level per employee (and self-employed). They agreed, 
however (77 percent, 59 percent), that the welfare system and not the tax system should be used. 
The reason given for this stance as to zero rating was usually that zero rating complicates the VAT 
and is also not efficient as a “subsidy” for low-income persons. That is, zero rating not only 
“ subsidizes” the rich but also, for example, generally provides in absolute terms a larger subsidy 
for a rich family than for a poor family, because the former spends more on necessities than does 
the latter.
197. See note 12 above.
198. The seller, however, may have had a competitive advantage arising from a failure to collect taxes 
or from a collection at too low a rate.
199. The seller, however, may have been at a competitive disadvantage by reason of collecting 
excessive VAT from customers.
200. Section 24(3) of the U.K. Finance Bill of 1989 would not permit recovery of a mistaken 
overpayment of VAT if C&E is able to establish that “repayment. . .  would unjustly enrich the 
claimant. ”
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